Russian coastal defense battleships

Coastal defense battleship Admiral Senyavin.

The development of coastal battleships of the Russian fleet began in 1861 with the order from Great Britain of the armored battery “Pervenets” - the first Russian battleship. Two more ships were built according to this model in Russia. After news of the successful operations of the Monitor arrived from the United States in 1862, the Russian naval department became interested in the construction of this type of ship, called in Russia turret armored boats. In -1865, the fleet received ten turret-type armored boats of the Hurricane type, equipped with one two-gun turret. In addition, the fleet was supplied with double-turret armored boats of the Smerch and Rusalka types. All these ships had powerful armor for their size, but their seaworthiness turned out to be unsatisfactory. A very unusual project of a coastal battleship was implemented in -1876 for the Black Sea Fleet, having built two battleships according to the design of Vice Admiral A. A. Popov: “Novgorod” and “Vice Admiral Popov”, nicknamed “Popovkas”.

Despite the “large fleet” construction program, the Russian Navy Ministry retained interest in coastal battleships. This was explained by the special conditions of the Baltic Sea, the presence of coastal defense battleships in the fleets of Germany and Sweden, and especially the constant desire to save money, which aroused the desire to build as cheaply as possible, and therefore small ships. The impetus for the development of a new project for a small battleship was the development in France for the Greek fleet of the battleship Hydra, which had solid armament and armor with a displacement of less than 5,000 tons. Based on these limitations, designer E. N. Gulyaev prepared a design for a small battleship with a shallow draft, armed with four 229 mm guns as the main caliber. The project was approved in 1891, after its approval the weapons were changed to the latest 254 mm guns. The lead battleship of the Admiral Senyavin class was laid down in 1892, and in the same year the construction of the same type Admiral Ushakov began. In 1894, the third battleship of this type was laid down - Admiral General Apraksin. The overload revealed during the construction of the first two battleships forced the Apraksin's armament to be reduced to three 254 mm guns. The average caliber on all battleships was the same and consisted of four 120 mm guns.

Dutch coastal defense battleships

Coastal defense battleship Konegen Regentes.

This successful type was developed in the battleship Maarten Harpertzon Tromp, launched in 1904. The main difference was the placement of 150 mm guns in turrets instead of casemates. The Jacob van Heemswerk, launched in 1906, was almost the same type. With a slightly smaller displacement, it carried six medium-caliber guns instead of four. All small battleships of the Netherlands were built with high quality in domestic shipyards, had a high side and were distinguished by good seaworthiness.

Swedish Coastal Defense Ironclads

Coastal defense battleship "Svea".

Coastal defense battleships were given particular importance in Sweden, whose small fleet was developed with an eye on Russia's capabilities. Lacking the resources for full-scale competition at sea, the Swedish naval leadership relied on the development of small, but well-armed and protected artillery ships coastal zone, believing that in special conditions Swedish coast, replete with skerries and shoals, such combat units will be very effective even against full-fledged battleships.

The development of armored coastal defense ships in Sweden, as in a number of other countries, began with monitors. In 1864, three ships of the John Ericsson type were laid down at Swedish shipyards, modeled on the famous Monitor by J. Ericsson. These were small monitors with a very low freeboard, armed with two 240 mm guns in a single turret, and capable of reaching a speed of only 7 knots. The displacement of these monitors did not even reach 1500 tons. In 1867, the Swedes laid down another monitor - “Loke”, a little larger and a little better armed. Although all these ships were criticized for their low seaworthiness and slow speed, the Swedish naval command considered them very useful in the coastal defense system.

Coastal defense battleship Oscar II.

The first real coastal defense battleships were ships of the Svea type. The lead battleship was laid down in 1884, the next two in 1891, and they entered service in 1893. With a displacement of just over 3,000 tons, they were well protected, developed a very decent speed for their time of 15-16 knots, and carried two 254-mm guns in the bow turret as their main armament. The medium caliber was represented by four 152 mm guns. The shallow draft allowed these combat units to operate in areas inaccessible to larger ships. At the beginning of the 20th century they were re-equipped with rapid-fire artillery.

The next series of coastal defense battleships also consisted of three ships and were known as the Oden class. They were a development of their predecessors, with slightly improved characteristics. The main caliber was now located in two single-gun turrets at the bow and stern. The entire trio entered service in -1899. In 1901, the fleet was replenished with another small battleship, the Dristigeten. Its main feature was the first use of a new main caliber - a 210 mm gun, the middle caliber became 150 mm. This combination stuck with Swedish battleships for a long time.

Coastal defense battleship "Svarie".

Based on Dristigeten, the Swedes developed new project, which was reproduced in four copies. These were battleships of the Eran type, which entered service in -1904. They carried lighter armor than the prototype, but turned out to be somewhat faster, and their medium caliber was now located in turrets instead of casemates. The line of development of the early battleships of the Swedish fleet was completed by Oscar II, built by 1907. Its displacement exceeded 4,000 tons, its speed reached 18 knots, and all medium-caliber artillery was now housed in two-gun turrets. Thus, in 20 years the Swedes built 12 coastal defense battleships and for some time became one of the ten strongest naval powers.

After this, the Swedes paused in the construction of ships of this class, returning to the creation of coastal defense battleships after the outbreak of the First World War. In 1915, the lead ship of the Svariye type was laid down, then two more. All of them entered service in -1922. It should be noted that most of the funds for their construction were collected by subscription from the population. The project really became a new word in the development of the class. The displacement doubled and approached 8,000 tons; the main caliber was now represented by powerful 283-mm cannons in two-gun turrets. The steam turbine installation allowed these battleships to reach speeds of more than 22 knots. The armor was also quite substantial for ships of this size.

The Swedish naval command considered this type to be ideal coastal defense ships. When the question arose about replacing the outdated Oscar II, a new project was developed on the basis of Svariye. The main difference from the prototype was to be powerful universal and anti-aircraft artillery. But the project was abandoned, instead all ships of the Svariye type were modernized in the 1930s.

The last battleships of the Swedish fleet were planned to be ordered in 1939, but the course of military operations at sea in the outbreak of World War II forced the command to doubt the compliance of the very concept of a coastal defense battleship with the new realities. As a result, the Swedes chose to build light cruisers of the Tre Krunur class.

Norwegian coastal defense battleships

Coastal defense battleship Norge.

The customer was completely satisfied with the ships received and therefore reacted positively to Armstrong’s proposal received at the end of 1898 to build two more battleships for the Norwegian fleet, which were an improved version of the Harald Haarfagrfe. F. Watts developed six options for the future ship, and in the spring of 1899, both Norge-class battleships were laid down in Elswick. They differed from the previous type in their slightly larger sizes and less thick armor, but the medium caliber was now represented by 152 mm guns. Norge and Eidsvold were transferred to the fleet in 1901. Over the next 40 years, the four coastal defense battleships remained the most powerful ships of the Norwegian Navy and were maintained in very good technical condition.

Danish Coastal Defense Ironclads

Coastal defense battleship Herluf Trolle.

The development of armored ships of the Danish fleet in the 1860-1880s proceeded unevenly, since the naval command for a long time could not develop the most suitable type of small battleship for Denmark. As a result, the displacement of ships of this class ranged from just over 1,300 tons for the Rolf Krake to more than 5,000 tons for the Helgoland. The first ship fully corresponding to the class of coastal defense battleships left the slipway in 1886 under the name Iver Hvitfeld. With a displacement of 3,300 tons, the ship carried two 260 mm guns in barbette mounts, as well as 120 mm and small-caliber guns.

Ten years later, the Danish Navy attempted to create a battleship with the smallest possible draft for operations in the shallow waters of the Danish Straits. In 1897, Skjold, one of the smallest battleships in the world, entered service. Due to the displacement, which only slightly exceeded 2000 tons, it was possible to achieve a draft of about 4 m. The armament of such a small ship naturally turned out to be weak. Skjold had one 240 mm gun in the bow turret and three 120 mm guns in single turrets in the stern.

Subsequently, the Danish fleet preferred to build battleships similar in their characteristics to the Swedish ones. In 1897, construction of a series of ships of the Herluf Trolle type began. The lead battleship entered service in 1901. Each of the three ships was carefully tested, changes were made to the construction of subsequent ones, so the last ship of the series joined the fleet only in 1909. Varying in details, all battleships of this type carried two 240-mm guns in single turrets and four 150-mm guns in as medium-caliber artillery.

Construction of the last Danish battleship took nine years. The decision to build the Niels Juel was made in 1914. It was planned to create a battleship with a main caliber of two 305 mm guns. But the first one that started World War showed that the main opponent of coastal defense battleships would be light forces and aviation. Therefore, the project was thoroughly reworked and in 1923 the Nils Juel entered service with ten 150 mm guns as its main armament, which were later supplemented with anti-aircraft guns. The displacement exceeded 4,000 tons, but the speed of the battleship remained very modest and did not exceed its predecessors.

Finnish coastal defense battleships

Coastal defense battleship Väinämöinen.

The last coastal defense battleships in history were built in Finland. The decision to build these ships for the Finnish Navy was made in 1927, and a German-Dutch company was directly involved in the development of the project. The task was to combine the size of the Danish battleship Nils Juel with the armament of the Swedish Svarie, which had twice the displacement. As a result, the battleships were able to install powerful weapons of four 254 mm guns in two-gun turrets, as well as 105 mm universal guns and anti-aircraft guns. All this managed to fit into a displacement of about 4000 tons. The price for this achievement was weakened armor, and the side armor could only protect the ship from small-caliber shells and shrapnel.

The power plant turned out to be original. For the first time on the surface warship installed diesel-electric units. This provided the battleships with exceptional maneuverability, necessary in skerries. Special attention paid attention to the hull design, which made it possible to operate even in difficult ice conditions characteristic of the Gulf of Finland. The lead battleship Väinämöinen was laid down in 1929, and in the same year construction of the Ilmarinen began, both of which were built at domestic shipyards. Both battleships entered the fleet in 1932 and became its most powerful ships.

Notes

  1. Naval Dictionary. - M: Military Publishing House, 1990. - P. 61. - ISBN 5-203-00174-X
  2. Katorin Yu.F. Armadillos. - St. Petersburg: Galeya-Print, 2008. - P. 109. - ISBN 978-5-8172-0116-1
  3. Katorin Yu.F. Armadillos. - P. 114.
  4. Katorin Yu.F. Armadillos. - P. 46.
  5. Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1860-1905. - London: Conway Maritime Press, 1979. - P. 360. - ISBN 0-85177-133-5
  6. Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1860-1905. - P. 361.
  7. Taras A. E. Encyclopedia of armadillos and battleships. - M.: Harvest, AST, 2002. - P. 374. - ISBN 985-13-1009-3

In his essay, the author will try to highlight the construction of the German armored fleet after the unification of the country in 1870-1871. and before the start of Tirpitz’s program for the construction of the High Seas Fleet, which unfolded at the end of the 19th century.

And although created at German and foreign shipyards in the 1870-1880s. the armored fleet could not yet compete not only with the British or French fleets, but also with the fleets of minor countries, Germany managed to solve the main problem: to secure maritime boundaries in the Baltic and create a strong defense of the North Sea coast. The main thing that was done in those years was to lay the foundation for the production base of military shipbuilding, train officer personnel, and create a sufficient reserve of subjects of the German Empire who had completed naval service.

And the main burden of training naval “personnel” fell precisely on the first battleships of Germany.

Siegfried-class coastal defense battleships

The names of these ships corresponded to the names of mythical characters from Northern European legends. Siegfried and Hagen are heroes of the German epic (almost the same as the Russians Ilya Muromets and Dobrynya Nikitich); Beowulf is a character in English epic stories; Fridtjof - hero of the Icelandic sagas; Heimdal is a deity and hero of Norwegian legends; Hildebrand is the tragic hero of the German epic; Aegir is the god of the sea among the Germanic tribes.

The project was developed by the Imperial Naval Office in 1885-1887. based on experience Franco-Prussian War. The ships were designed specifically to protect the mouths of German rivers and the Kiel Canal, as well as for operations in the Baltic Sea. Their appearance in the German fleet occurred at a time when fluctuations in the views of the German naval command on large ships intensified in connection with the appearance of mine weapons.

The battleships had a steel hull with a wide underwater part and a flat bottom - this contributed to good stability. There were two side keels, the formation of the stern was sharp, with a cut behind the stern gun to increase the sector of its fire. The battleships maneuvered quite well and held their course.

In 1899, as an experiment, the Hagen was lengthened and the ship was simultaneously modernized. The work was completed in 1900 and was considered quite successful. Until the beginning of 1904, they planned to carry out similar modifications on the remaining ships of the series. Both before and after modernization, the ships differed slightly from each other. This also applied to their appearance, and to combat and technical characteristics.

"Siegfried". Until 1903, it was listed as part of the active fleet, then transferred to the reserve. In 1914, the ship was withdrawn from the reserve and included in the 6th squadron of the High Seas Fleet, in which it was a member in 1914-1915. In 1915-1916 the ship was listed in coastal defense. Since 1916, disarmed, she was stationed in Vindava, then as a training ship in Wilhelmshaven. Expelled from the fleet on June 17, 1919. It was planned to convert the Siegfried into a floating crane, but it was soon sold to the company N. Peters” for 425 thousand marks. It was dismantled in 1920 at the Northern Pier in Kiel.


"Beowulf" In 1914-1915 was in the 6th squadron of the High Seas Fleet and performed coastal defense tasks in the Baltic. In 1916 it was withdrawn from active combat service, disarmed and served as a training target for submarines, in 1918 it was used as an icebreaker in the Baltic, in November 1918 it was interned in Stockholm, on June 17, 1919 it was removed from the lists of the fleet and sold for scrap to Norddeutsche Tieefbauges (Berlin). In 1921 it was dismantled in Danzig.

“Fritjof.” He served in the 6th Squadron of the High Seas Fleet in 1914-1915. In 1915-1916 performed coastal defense tasks in the Baltic. In 1916 she was disarmed and used as a training ship in Danzig, in 1923 she was rebuilt into a motor freighter at the “De Werckre” shipyard in Rüstingen. Dismantled in 1930 in Danzig.

“Gamedal.” In 1914-1915 was in the 6th squadron of the High Seas Fleet, in 1915-1916. performed coastal defense tasks in the Baltic. After disarmament, she was used as a training ship for submariners and was stationed in Emden, expelled on June 17, 1919. It was planned to rebuild the ship into a floating crane. Dismantled at Ronebeek in 1921.

"Hildebrand". In 1914-1915 was in the 6th squadron of the High Seas Fleet, disarmed in 1916 and used simultaneously as a training ship and water desalinator, in 1916-1918. was in Vindava, removed from the lists on June 17, 1919. On December 21, 1919, en route to the dismantling site, it ran aground off the Dutch coast and was destroyed by the ensuing storm. The remains of the ship were partially blown up and dismantled in 1933.

“Hagen.” In 1914-1915 was in the 6th squadron of the High Seas Fleet, in coastal defense since 1915. Disarmed in 1915 and used as a training ship, based alternately at Swinemünde, Libau, Danzig and Warnemünde. On June 17, 1919, it was excluded and sold for scrap to the company “Norddeutsche Tiefganges” (Berlin).

"One". In coastal defense in 1914-1916. Since 1917, it was used as a blockhouse in Wilhelmshaven; on December 6, 1919, it was decommissioned and sold for scrap to the company “F.A. Bernstein” (Hamburg). In 1922, rebuilt into a motor freight vessel at the Wercke shipyard (Rüstinegen). Dismantled in 1935.

Main stages of construction of Siegfried-class battleships
Name "Siegfried" "Beowulf" “Fritjof” "Hildebrand"
Place of construction “Germania Werft” Kiel “A.G. Weser” Bremen “A.G. Weser” Bremen “Kaiserische Werft Kiel
Construction No. 44 100 101 20
Cost (thousand marks) 4 770 5 288 5 375 5 895
Pawned December 27, 1888 1890 February 15, 1890 12.1890
Lowered August 10, 1889 November 8, 1890 November 8, 1890 August 6, 1892
Vst. into operation April 29, 1890 April 1, 1892 February 23, 1893 October 28, 1893
Name "Hagen" "Egir" "Gamedal" "One"
Place of construction “Kaiserische Werft” Kiel “Kaiserische Werft” Kiel “Kaiserische Werft” Wilhelmshaven “Kaiserische Werft” Danzig
Construction No. 21 22 14 -
Cost (thousand marks) 5 921 6 645 6 110 6 539
Pawned September 14, 1891 November 28, 1892 November 2, 1891 April 15, 1893
Lowered October 21, 1893 April 3, 1895 July 27, 1892 November 3, 1894
Vst. into operation. October 2, 1894 October 15, 1896 April 7, 1894 February 22, 1896

"Egir". From August 1914 he served in the 6th squadron of the High Seas Fleet. Transferred to coastal defense in 1915, disarmed in 1916, in 1916-1918. used as a training ship and blockade in Wilhelmshaven. Expelled on June 17, 1919 and sold to F.A. Bernstein”, rebuilt into a motor freighter at the “De Wercke” shipyard (Rüstingen). On December 18, 1929, she ran aground off the Dutch coast. The wreckage was then partially dismantled by Marine-Ehremat Laboe.

Soon after construction (after 5-7 years of active service) at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries. all battleships underwent major modernization, which changed their appearance. The work was carried out at state-owned enterprises “Kaiserisce Werft”, but in different cities - Kiel and Danzig.

All the ships differed from each other in minor details, but “Aegir” and “Odin”, built last, differed from the entire series quite seriously.

They had a displacement of 3500 tons normal, 3741 tons full (“Egir” 3550/3574 tons), length 76.4 m along the design waterline, 79 m maximum. After modernization, the length was 81.4 m between perpendiculars, 84.8 m along the design waterline, 86.13 m at its greatest, width 14.9 m along the design waterline, for “E"gir” and “Odin” 15.4 m, draft 5.51 m bow, 5.74 m stern (“Egir” and “Odin” 5.61 m/5.47 m), side height 10.23 m amidships (“Egir” and “Odin” 10.25 m).

They had steel-iron armor

“Compound” on teak lining. On “Aegir” and “Odin”, as well as the main caliber armored turrets on “Hildebrand”, “Hagen” and “Heimdal”, Krupp armor was installed, also laid on a teak lining. Before modernization, the waterline belt had a height of 2.115 m and rose above the water by 1.4 m. All slabs were mounted on a 290-300 mm teak cushion. “Aegir” and “Odin” from frame 12 to frame 51 had a thickness of 220/120 mm, from the stern post to frame 12 and from frame 51 to the stem there was no armor.

The armor deck was protected by 30-35 mm (on “Aegir” and “Odin” 30 mm) sheets. The main caliber barbettes and turrets had 200 mm plates (on a 200 mm teak cushion), 30 mm turret domes, 12 mm artillery shields, deckhouses: bow 30-80 mm (on “Aegir” and “Odin” 30-120 mm) . Cork cofferdams ran along the sides.



In 1890-1897 the ships had anti-mine nets.

After modernization, the armor of the ships also changed. The waterline belt is 2.1 m high and towering, still, 1.4 m above the waterline from the sternpost to frame 5, had an armor thickness of 180 to 240 mm. All slabs were laid on teak with a thickness of 100-290 mm. The barbettes and towers of the main caliber had slabs of 200 mm (on a teak cushion of 200 mm), the embrasures of the towers of the main caliber were 50 mm, and the domes of the towers were 30 mm (“Egir” and “Odin” 50 mm). The cork rubber dams were retained.

The ships were equipped with three vertical triple expansion steam engines and each had 4 locomotive span-type boilers. After modernization, 8 water tube boilers were installed on them. On the Hagen and Egir boilers of the Thornycroft system, manufactured by the Oderwerke plant in Stettin, were installed; on the others, boilers of the Marine-Schulz system were installed. The ships had two engine rooms, two boiler rooms, two chimneys (there was one chimney on the Odin), one ordinary-type rudder and two three-blade propellers of the Hirsch-Griffiths system. The design power was to be 4800 indicator hp, speed 15 knots. Before and after modernization, the battleships had a speed ranging from 14.4 to 15.5 knots.







The fuel supply was 220 tons of coal and 220 tons of oil, after modernization: 350-580 tons of coal and 100-500 tons of oil (“Odin” and “Egir” 270-370 tons of coal, after modernization 480-580 tons of coal and 100-500 tons of oil). The cruising range was 1490 miles at 10 knots and 740 miles full at 14 knots (after modernization 3400 miles at 10 knots and 1940 miles at 14 knots). The Aegir and Odin had a cruising range of 2,200 miles at 10 knots and 1,490 miles at 14 knots.

The ship was supplied with electricity by 3 dynamos with a power of 29-36 kW and a voltage of 67 V. Later the power was increased to 48-60 kW. The battleship “Egir” had 6 dynamos with a power of 243 kW and a voltage of 120 V. Later the power was increased to 250 kW. Due to the presence of a large number of auxiliary mechanisms, for those times, this battleship received the nickname “Electric Anna” from the sailors.



The following weapons were installed on the ships: 3 240-mm guns weighing 13 tons each in turret mounts with ammunition of 204 (later increased to 225) shells, 8 88-mm guns weighing 6.89 tons each in turret mounts with a total ammunition capacity of 1500-2000 shells . Before modernization, the Siegfried had only 6 88-mm guns. After modernization, all battleships had 10 88-mm guns, 6 37-mm revolving guns, 4 8-mm machine guns and 1 60-mm landing gun. To arm the landing company, the ships had 118-146 rifles and 10 revolvers.

The mine armament consisted of 4 350-mm torpedo tubes (1 stern rotating, 2 side rotating, 1 bow) with a reserve of 8 torpedoes. The battleships “Egir” and “Odin” were equipped with 3 450-mm torpedo tubes (2 side rotary and 1 bow) with an ammunition supply of 8 torpedoes. After modernization, all ships had 3,450 mm torpedo tubes (one stern rotating and 2 side) and 1,350 mm (bow). The torpedo ammunition was 8 and 3 torpedoes, respectively. The ships each had 2 combat searchlights.

The crew included 20 officers and 256 sailors. On the “Hildebrand” and “Aegir” (as flagship ships), 6 more officers and 22 sailors were added.

The boat armament included 1 steam launch, 1 whaleboat, 2 cutters, 1-2 gigs, 1-2 yawls and 1 (later 2) two-oared yawl.



Appearance in the lineup Russian fleet The battleship Admiral General Apraksin, which became widely known thanks to the extraordinary circumstances of its rescue in the harsh winter of 1899/1900, became possible as a result of curious transformations of the five-year (1891 - 1895) plan for enhanced shipbuilding.

The initial version of this plan, known in the literature as the interim program of 1890, was presented by Admiral N.M. Chikhachev and approved by Emperor Alexander III on November 24 of this year. It provided for the construction of 10 armored cruisers. However, the very next year, the increase in the size and cost of ocean-going armored ships led the author of the program, N.M. Chikhachev, to the idea of ​​replacing some of them with “small” armored ships, or “coastal battleships.”


In 1892, against the allocated appropriations, along with the ships of the Poltava and Sisoy the Great type, the battleships Admiral Senyavin and Admiral Ushakov were laid down in St. Petersburg with a normal design displacement of only 4126 tons. At the end of 1893 , when the actual size and cost of all the ships in the program became clear, and it became clear that limited opportunities The port of St. Petersburg does not allow it to be completed in a timely manner, Admiral N.M. Chikhachev, having abandoned the already ordered battleship of the Sisoy the Great type and the cruiser of the Rurik type, decided to build a third coastal defense battleship of the Admiral Senyavin type. Probably, the energetic manager of the Naval Ministry secured the verbal consent of the tsar and the admiral general. It is possible that such a free fulfillment of the highest plans of 1890 avoided scandalous consequences only thanks to the change of government in 1894, when the place of the deceased in Bose Alexandra III His son, Nicholas II, took over. Battleships of the Admiral Senyavin class were designed in 1889-1891 by the Marine Technical Committee (MTK) under the leadership of the famous shipbuilder E.E. Gulyaev. During the construction of the first two ships on the stocks (1892-1894), practical drawings were drawn up by senior shipbuilder P.P. Mikhailov (builder of the Senyavin) and senior assistant shipbuilder D.V. Skvortsov (overseeing the construction of Ushakov), and significant changes were made to the original project. Therefore, Mikhailov and Skvortsov can be considered Gulyaev’s “co-authors” in the design of ships. The English firms Model, Sons and Field and Humphreys Tennant and Co. (suppliers of the main mechanisms for Ushakov and Senyavin), MTK artillerymen, mainly S.O. Makarov and A. .F. Brink (selection and design of large guns), as well as the Putilov plant - supplier of hydraulically driven turret installations. As a result, both in the composition of their weapons and in their appearance, the battleships differed significantly from the original design, and in the design of the main engines (and the height of the chimneys) they also differed from each other.

In December 1893, simultaneously with the order to build the third coastal defense battleship, Admiral Chikhachev ordered machines and boilers for it to be ordered from the Franco-Russian plant in St. Petersburg, which was to manufacture them according to the drawings of Maudslay’s “Ushakov” mechanisms. Therefore, the new ship, named “Admiral General Apraksin”, was called in many documents an “Admiral Ushakov” type battleship.

Preparatory work work on the hull began in February 1894, and on October 12, the first pounds of metal were placed on the slipway of the wooden boathouse of the New Admiralty, vacated after the launch of the Sisoy the Great. The official laying of the Admiral General Apraksin took place on May 20 of the following year, and its builder was D.V. Skvortsov, one of the most energetic and talented Russian naval engineers at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries.

It seemed that the construction of the third coastal defense battleship according to the already worked out and corrected prototype drawings would not cause any particular difficulties and would not require adjustments to the project. However, in practice, everything turned out to be different precisely because of the additions to the 1891 project, which caused the overload of the first two ships, as well as because of the desire to improve the 254 mm turret system. In February 1895, D.V. Skvortsov calculated the load of the Admiral Ushakov, the draft of which in a normal load exceeded the design by 10 "/2 inches (0.27 m). In order to avoid overloading the Admiral General Apraksin, the builder proposed reducing the thickness of the entire side armor by 1 inch (25.4 mm), “destroy the turret installations of 10-inch guns by placing the guns on machines behind the barbette and covering them with spherical shields,” cover the supply of shells and charges with thick armor (barbettes) and use electric winches .

Even earlier, on July 15, 1894, MTK artillerymen led by Rear Admiral S.O. Makarov, in the conditions for the design of two-gun mounts of 254 mm guns, for the first time put forward the requirements for ensuring the loading speed of each gun of no more than 1.5 minutes and an elevation angle of 35°. The design of such hydraulically driven installations by three factories (for the battleship Rostislav) in the fall of the same year showed the possibility of ensuring the specified parameters. However, in February 1895, MTK, also for the first time, chose a more promising one for the Apraksin turrets - an electric drive with similar loading speeds and elevation angles, while reducing the thickness of the vertical armor of the turret to 7 inches (178 mm), the barbette - to 6 (152 mm) and roofs - up to 1.25 inches (about 32 mm). The total weight of the turret with armor protection should not exceed 255 tons.

In June 1895, based on the results of a competitive design, it was decided to give the order for turret installations for Admiral General Apraksin to the Putilov Plant, although the project of the Metal Plant, which had been developing electric drives since 1892, had “the same advantages.” The Metal Plant probably had the best chance of successfully completing the order, but requested more high price. Somewhat earlier, electric tower mechanisms were also chosen for the battleship Rostislav (ordered by the Obukhov plant), and later similar towers were ordered for the battleships Oslyabya and Peresvet. Therefore, it was the Rostislav and Admiral General Apraksin (and not the Peresvet-class battleships) that became the first ships in the Russian fleet with electric tower installations. At the same time, for the last battleship, in order to reduce overload, the MTK in April-May 1895 approved the installation of one 254-mm gun in the aft turret instead of two. The Putilov plant undertook to deliver both Apraksin towers by the end of September 1897.

Thus, MTK rejected Skvortsov’s proposal to replace the towers with barbettes and reduced the number of large-caliber guns by a quarter. To compensate for the increased weight of the new towers compared to hydraulic ones, it was decided to reduce the side armor by 1.5 inches.

By the beginning of 1896, D.V. Skvortsov brought the Apraksin's hull readiness to 54.5%. The ship was launched on April 30, 1896, and the first test drive took place in the fall of 1897. The production of the main mechanisms at the Franco-Russian plant was supervised by engineers P.L. One and A.G. Arkhipov, who were present at the tests of Maudslay's machines on the Admiral Ushakov. Sea trials of the Admiral General Apraksin were completed in the fall of 1898, and experimental firing from 254 mm turrets was completed only in August of the following year.

The normal displacement of the Admiral General Apraksin was 4438 tons (according to the prototype design - 4126 tons) with a maximum length of 86.5 m (according to the GVL - 84.6 m), a width of 15.9 and an average draft of 5.5 m.

The battleship's load was distributed as follows: the hull with armor lining, useful things, systems, devices and supplies - 2040 tons (46.0% of the normal displacement, the hull itself accounted for about 1226 tons or 29.7%), armor - 812 tons (18.4%), artillery weapons - 486 tons (11%), mines - 85 tons (1.9%), vehicles and boilers with water - 657 tons (14.8%), normal coal reserves - 214 tons (4 .8%), boats, anchors, chains - 80 tons (1.8%), crew with luggage - 60 tons (1.3%).

The ship's displacement with a full supply of coal (400 tons) reached 4624 tons.

The launching mass of the Apraksin hull (draught at the bow - 1.93 m, at the stern - 3.1 m) did not exceed 1500 tons. In peacetime, the battleship's displacement was about 4500 tons, and on the morning of the first day of the Battle of Tsushima (May 14, 1905) with with a cargo of 446 tons of coal and about 200 tons of fresh water, the Apraksin, with an average draft of about 5.86 m, had a displacement of 4810 tons.

The riveted hull of the ship was divided into 15 main compartments by waterproof bulkheads that reached the armored (aka battery) deck. Throughout frames 15-59 there was a double bottom (10 double-bottom waterproof compartments). The stems, steering frame (weighing 3.5 tons) and propeller shaft brackets were cast at the Obukhov plant. The drainage system, which included a main pipe with a diameter of 457 mm, was carried out at the Admiralty Izhora Plants.

The armor protection included a main armor belt along the waterline 53.6 m long and 2.1 m wide (with immersion in water of 1.5 m) made of “Harvey” plates with a thickness of 216 mm in the upper part (9 plates in the middle of each side) and 165 mm (6 end plates each). The armored citadel was enclosed by bow (165 mm) and stern (152 mm) beams, and was protected from above by a 38 mm armor deck (25.4 mm armor plates on a 12.7 mm steel deck). The main mechanisms and ammunition cellars were located under the protection of the citadel. The bow and stern ends were partially protected by a carapace deck with a total thickness of 38 to 64 mm. The conning tower was formed by two 178-mm armor plates with an entrance to it through a hatch in the spardeck deck. The same armor protected the turrets of large-caliber guns, the bases (barbettes) for which were armored with 152-mm plates.

The main mechanisms of the battleship included two vertical triple expansion machines (cylinders with a diameter of 787, 1172 and 1723 mm) with a design power of 2500 hp each. each (at 124 rpm) and four cylindrical steam boilers (working steam pressure 9.1 kgf/cm2). Five steam dynamos produced D.C. voltage 100 V. Ten coal pits contained 400 tons of coal. In 1896-1897, about 34 tons of “oil” (fuel oil) was taken into the coal pit between frames 33 and 37 as an experiment. A week’s stay of fuel oil in the pit revealed a completely satisfactory tightness of the vertical rivet joints, but about 240 kg of “oil” flowed into the adjacent coal pit through the top due to leaks in the connection of the bulkhead with the armored deck. The planned oil heating of the boilers on the Apraksin, as well as on some other Baltic battleships, was not actually used.

The installation of the main machines, boilers and smoke works on the ship was completed in November 1896, at the same time (November 18) the machines were tested during mooring trials. The steam pressure in three boilers was increased to 7.7 kgf/cm2. shaft rotation speed up to 35-40 rpm. Sea trials of the Admiral General Apraksin began only in the fall of 1897, when the battleship under the command of Captain 1st Rank N.A. Rimsky-Korsakov conducted his first campaign in a detachment of ships assigned for testing (flag of Rear Admiral V.P. Messer). However, all three factory tests (from October 11 to 21) ended in failure: the cars developed power from only 3200 to 4300 hp, and the tests themselves had to be interrupted each time due to malfunctions (a knock in the cylinder, an error in the drawing of the steam regulator, drop in steam pressure in boilers).

The board of the Franco-Russian plant saw the reasons for this situation in the poor quality of coal and the lack of experience of the plant stokers, but the next year the tests were repeatedly postponed due to various problems. Finally, on October 14, 1898, during an official 6-hour test, the battleship's vehicles developed 4804 hp, and the average speed (over four runs per measured mile) was only 14.47 knots (maximum - 15.19 knots). The English prototype vehicles (Ushakova) at one time developed more than 5,700 hp, working for almost 12 hours and providing a speed of over 16 knots. Therefore, the head of the Maritime Ministry, Vice Admiral P.P. Tyrtov, ordered the Apraksin sample to be repeated, which was done on October 20 of the same year after coating the steam pipes and receiving coal.

This time, within 7 hours of full speed, the battleship showed average speed 15.07 knots with a total vehicle power of 5763 hp. and a displacement (at the beginning of testing) of 4152 tons. Why the 16-knot speed was not achieved is not entirely clear, but the leadership of the ministry assessed the results of the test as “brilliant,” and a number of documents noted that the maximum speed reached 17 knots, which in principle could have happened with such a significant excess of the design capacity.

The estimated cruising range of the Apraksin at full speed (15 knots) with a normal (214 tons) supply of coal reached 648 miles, at 10 knots - 1392 miles. Consequently, a full supply of coal provided a cruising range of about 2,700 miles at a speed of 10 knots.

The battleship's artillery armament included three 254 mm, four 120 mm, ten 47 mm, twelve 37 mm guns and two 64 mm Baranovsky landing guns. Two 254-mm guns were placed in the bow turret (total installation weight 258.3 tons) and one in the stern turret (217.5 tons). As a result, the savings were small. The towers were equipped with electric and manual (backup) drives. The forward two-gun turret had eight electric motors of the Gram and Siemens system: two each for the rotating and lifting mechanisms, lifting the chargers and operating the hammers. The total power of the electric motors reached 72.25 kW (98 hp). The action of the aft tower was provided by four electric motors with a power of 36.15 kW (49 hp).

The Apraksin was equipped with 254-mm guns with a length of 45 calibers, designed by A.F. Brink, somewhat improved compared to the guns of the first two battleships. The weight of the barrel of one gun was 22.5 tons (as on the Rostislav and Peresvet). Initial speed projectile flight (225.2 kg), as for the Ushakov and Senyavin guns, had to be limited to 693 m/s. The elevation angle of the guns reached 35°, while for firing at elevation angles above 15°, parts of the armored roof above the embrasures were hinged, which ensured a firing range of up to 73 kb.

120-mm Kane cannons, which had a firing range of 54 kb, were located on the upper deck in the corners of the superstructure (spardeck) without armor protection and without shields.

Two 47-mm Hotchkiss guns stood on the sides in the “captain's room” - a large room aft on the battery deck, two between the 120-mm guns on the upper deck in the superstructure, the rest on the spardeck and bridges. Eight 37-mm Hotchkiss guns on swivel mounts were located on the combat top of the foremast, two on the bridge, and two more were used to arm the boats.

The mine armament included four 381-mm bronze surface mines: bow, stern (in the captain's room), two side and three combat searchlights. The obstacle mines (30 pieces), provided for by the 1891 project, were removed from the armament during the construction of the first battleships of this type, but the mine nets that had been canceled were restored during the testing of the ship. The ship's two 34-foot steam boats had mine launchers.

The artillery of “Admiral General Apraksin” was tested by firing on July 23 and 24, 1899 by the commission of Rear Admiral F.A. Amosov. The firing was quite successful, although the shutters of the ports of the 120-mm guns required some alteration, and the turrets showed a tendency to “settle” (as on the Poltava-class battleships). The loading speed of 254 mm guns “electrically” was 1 min 33 s (the interval between shots). Fortunately, the “subsidence” of the towers did not progress subsequently. However, the turrets themselves, when used intensively (up to 54 rounds per campaign), caused quite a lot of criticism. Thus, there were breakdowns of the coupling gear teeth and failures of the electric drive due to poor wire insulation.

The quality of the New Admiralty's hull work also left much to be desired. Commission V.P. Messera discovered missing rivets, and some of the remaining holes were clogged with wooden choppers. The shortcomings of the drainage system were noticed by Vice Admiral S.O. Makarov, who studied in detail the first two battleships of the same type.

By tactical and technical elements“Admiral General Apraksin” was not only not inferior to ships of its class in the German, Danish and Swedish fleets (as of 1899), but also had a number of advantages due to the relatively advantageous combination of the caliber of the main artillery, the system of its deployment and protection. In the Baltic conditions, the battleship fully satisfied its purpose, and its entry into service was of particular importance in connection with the need to master the turret electric drives already adopted for future squadron battleships.

However, the hopes of some admirals to use Apraksin for the purpose of training gunners were in vain due to the events of the autumn of 1899. At first, the 1899 campaign went quite well for the battleship. On August 4, having completed the tests and having on board about 320 tons of coal and reserves for summer campaign, "Admiral General Apraksin" left Kronstadt. At noon the next day, the commander of the battleship, Captain 1st Rank V.V. Lipdestrem, safely brought him to Revel as part of the Artillery Training Detachment. During his service in the Apraksin detachment, he went out for shooting five times with officer class students and gunner students, using up 628 rounds of training 37-mm barrels, as well as 9 254 mm and 40 120 mm shells. The shooting turned out to be quite troublesome for the senior artillery officer, Lieutenant F.V. Rimsky-Korsakov: on the fifth day, the sleeve and the device for installing the training barrel were torn in the aft turret, and on the sixth, the horizontal guidance of the bow turret failed. This malfunction was resolved within 24 hours at the private Wiegandt plant, which restored the broken teeth of the coupling for converting from manual to electric control.

On August 14, 1899, Admiral General Apraksin set sail to sail to Copenhagen. A fresh north wind foreshadowed a stormy voyage. New ship, according to V.V. Lindeström, showed “excellent seaworthiness”: in head waves, only splashes flew onto the forecastle, and in head waves, the rolling range did not exceed 10° on board. The machine worked properly, providing an average speed of 11.12 knots with two boilers put into operation. On the morning of May 16, the low-lying green shores of Denmark appeared on the horizon, and at 2 p.m. the Apraksin was already on its barrel in the harbor of Copenhagen, finding there the yacht Tsarevna, the gunboat Threatening, and two Danish ships.

On August 22, Nicholas II and his family arrived in the Danish capital on the yacht “Standart”. The Apraksin's stopover in the capital of a friendly power was marked by numerous receptions and visits. Non-commissioned officers and sailors were regularly sent ashore. According to tradition, the King of Denmark “granted” the officers of “Apraksin” knights of the Order of the Dannebrog.

On September 14, leaving the imperial yachts to cruise through European ports, the battleship left the hospitable kingdom and arrived in Kronstadt two days later. On September 21, he ended the campaign, but did not disarm, in order to head to Libau after finishing construction work. The squadron battleships Poltava and Sevastopol also gathered there, completing their tests in a separate detachment of Rear Admiral F.I. Amosov.

Tuesday, November 12, 1899, scheduled for the Apraksin to set out to sea, began with fog and a gradual increase in northeast wind. The fog that cleared around 3 p.m. allowed the navigator of the Apraksin, Lieutenant P.P. Durnovo determined the deviation along the alignment of the Kronstadt lights, and commander V.V. Lindeström decided to follow the plan. Watching the barometer fall. Vladimir Vladimirovich hoped to take refuge in Revel, but he still had to get there.

By 20:00 the wind had increased to force six, and soon reached the force of a storm, aggravated by negative air temperatures and blizzards. The battleship, covered with a layer of ice, walked blindly - out of sight of the islands and lighthouses. Mechanical and manual logs were not used due to the freezing of water and the danger of sending people to the poop; the speed was determined by the revolutions of the cars.

At 20:45, the commander reduced the speed from 9 to 5.5 knots, intending to clarify the location by measuring the depth of the sea. Having not received definite results in this way, V.V. Lindeström and P.P. Durnovo considered that the battleship had drifted to the south and were going to decide by the lighthouse of Gogland, the largest island in the center of the Gulf of Finland. In fact, “Apraksin” turned out to be much further north, and at 3:30 minutes on November 13, at a speed of about 3 knots, it jumped onto the sandbank off the high, snow-covered southeastern coast of Gogland.

The blow seemed soft to the commander, and the situation did not seem hopeless. However, an attempt to refloat in full reverse failed, and an hour later water appeared in the bow stoker, which was quickly rising. The ship tilted up to 10° on the fawn side and in the seas the bottom hit the ground hard. V.V. Lindeström, thinking about saving people, decided to take the team ashore. Message with the last one where we gathered local residents, installed with the help of two rescue lines supplied from the fore-mars. By 15:00, the crossing of people was successfully completed, having previously stopped the steam raised after the accident in two aft and auxiliary boilers.

The accident of the new coastal defense battleship in St. Petersburg was learned from a telegram from the commander of the cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, who, while moving from Kronstadt to Revel, noticed the distress signals sent by the Apraksin. The head of the Naval Ministry, Vice Admiral P.P. Tyrtov, immediately ordered the squadron battleship Poltava to be sent to Gogland from Kronstadt, and the battleship Admiral Ushakov from Libau, supplying them with plasters and materials for rescue work, the head of which was appointed Rear Admiral F .I.Amosov, holding the flag on the Poltava. In addition to warships, the icebreaker Ermak, the steamship Moguchiy, two rescue ships of the private Revel rescue society and divers from the Kronstadt school of the maritime department were involved in the rescue of the Apraksin. “Admiral Ushakov” did not reach Gogland - it returned to Libau due to a breakdown of the steering gear.



On the morning of November 15, F.I. arrived at Apraksin. Amosov, who, without sharing the initial optimism of V.V. Lindeström (“with immediate help the battleship will be removed”), found the situation “extremely dangerous” and dependent on the weather. Fortunately, the Ermak could provide the fight against ice, but the telegraph to maintain communication with St. Petersburg was available only in Kotka, which made operational management of the work difficult.

It was possible to organize communication with the help of an outstanding invention of the late 19th century - radio. On December 10, 1899, Vice Admiral I.M. Dikov and acting chief mine inspector Rear Admiral K.S. Ostoletsky proposed to connect Gogland with the mainland using a “wireless telegraph” invented by A.S. Popov. On the same day, the manager of the ministry put a resolution on the report: “We can try, I agree...”. A.S. Popov himself, his assistant P.N. Rybkin, and captain 2nd rank G.I. soon went to the work site with sets of radio stations. Zalevsky and Lieutenant A.A. Remmert. On Hogland and on the island of Kutsalo near Kotka, the construction of masts for installing antennas began.

By this time, it became clear that “Apraksin,” in the apt expression of F.I. Amosov, literally “climbed into a pile of stones.” The top of a huge stone and an 8-ton granite boulder got stuck in the hull of the battleship, forming a hole with an area of ​​about 27 m2 to the left of the vertical keel in the area of ​​frames 12-23. Through it, the bow cartridge magazine of the Baranovsky guns, the mine magazine, the turret compartment, the hook chamber and the bomb magazine of the 254-mm turret, the entire bow compartment to the armored deck, were filled with water. Three other stones caused smaller destruction of the bottom. In total, the ship took in more than 700 tons of water, which could not be pumped out without sealing the holes. Stones stuck in the bottom made it difficult to move the Apraksin from its place.

Among the numerous proposals for saving the battleship, there were some very interesting ones. For example, place a “steel board” under the hull and, simultaneously with towing, lift it above the stone with explosions under the board of explosive charges (signed “Not a sailor, but just a Moscow tradesman”), “One of those who wished well to the battleship “Apraksin” suggested lifting the hull above the stone with using a huge lever made of rails.

Subsequently, commander V.V. Lindeström considered it quite feasible to use the “ice dock” designed by Major General Zharintsev to repair the ship at the accident site. The latter proposed freezing the water around the battleship to the very bottom using liquid carbon dioxide, and then cutting a trench to the bow to deepen the place and “free the surface of the seabed from stones.” However, rescuers took a different route.

All rescue operations were carried out under the general leadership and control of the head of the ministry, Admiral P.P. Tyrtov, who involved in this the most important matter famous admirals I.M. Dikova, V.P. Verkhovsky and S.O. Makarov, chief inspectors of the Ministry of Transport and Communications N.E. Kuteinikova, A.S. Krotkova, N.G. Nozikova. Direct participation in the rescue operations under the leadership of F.I. Amosov was taken by the commander of the battleship V.V. Lindeström, junior assistants of the shipbuilder P.P. Belyankin and E.S. Politovsky, a representative of the Revel Rescue Society von Franken and an index of the New Admiralty of Olympia, who knew the ship well. The divers working in the icy water were led by Lieutenants M.F. Shultz and A.K. Nebolsin. It was decided to remove the upper part of the large stone using explosions, unload the battleship, which at the time of the accident had a displacement of 4515 tons, if possible, seal the hole, pump out the water and, using pontoons, pull the battleship off the shoal.

Attempts to refloat the Apraksin were made twice: on November 28 (the icebreaker Ermak with the Apraksin in full reverse) and December 9 (the steamers Meteor and Helios came to the aid of the Ermak). After a thorough examination of the hull and the large rock by divers, it became clear that these attempts were doomed to failure.

The struggle with rocks that lasted until the freeze-up and attempts to move the Apraksin with tugboats failed led P.P. Tyrtov to the decision to postpone its refloating until the spring of next year. F.I. Amosov with the Poltava and the majority of the crew of the emergency ship was recalled to Kronstadt. To ensure the work, 36 sailors were left with the boatswain Ivan Safonov. The danger of destruction of the Apraksin by a pile of ice was avoided with the help of the Ermak and the strengthening of the ice fields around the battleship.

On January 25, 1900, the chairman of the MTK, Vice Admiral I.M. Dikov read an urgent telegram from Kotka: “Gogland’s telegram was received without wires by telephone, the front stone was removed.” Having reported it to P.P. Tyrtov, Ivan Mikhailovich received instructions to report the contents to the editorial office of Novoye Vremya and Government Gazette: this was the first radiogram transmitted over a distance of more than 40 miles.

At the end of January 1900, the commander of the Training Artillery Detachment, Rear Admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky, was appointed head of the rescue work on Gogland. Zinovy ​​Petrovich invited the Bureau for Soil Research, which belonged to the mining engineer Voislav, to participate in the rescue of the battleship. The Bureau sent technicians to Apraksin with two machines equipped with diamond drills for drilling holes in granite stones. The explosion of dynamite in the pits turned out to be harmless to the ship. Upon completion of the work, Vojislav even refused the reward. The Naval Ministry, expressing gratitude to him for his selflessness, paid 1,197 rubles. in the form of compensation for equipment breakdowns and maintenance of technicians.

By the beginning of April 1900, in conditions of a relatively harsh winter, it was possible to deal with the stones, temporarily seal some of the holes and unload the battleship by about 500 tons. On April 8, "Ermak" made an unsuccessful attempt to pull the ship 2 fathoms - the length created in solid ice lanes. Three days later, the attempt was repeated, flooding the aft compartments of the Apraksin and helping the Ermak with steam and coastal manual spiers. The battleship finally set off and by evening, with its own engines put into operation, moved 12 m back from the stone ridge.

On April 13, along the canal laid by Ermak, he crossed into the harbor near Gogland, and on April 22, he safely moored in Aspe near Kotka. Up to 300 tons of water remained in the battleship’s hull, which was continuously pumped out by pumps. With only 120 tons of coal and no artillery (except for turret guns), ammunition, provisions and most supplies, the draft at the bow and stern was 5.9 m each.

On May 6, the Admiral General Apraksin, accompanied by the cruiser Asia and two rescue ships of the Revel Society, arrived in Kronstadt, where it was soon placed for repairs at the Konstantinovsky dock, and on May 15 ended the protracted campaign. P.P. Tyrtov congratulated V.V. Lindeström with the end of a arduous epic and thanked all participants in the work, especially Z.P. Rozhdestvensky.

Repair of damage to the battleship using funds from the Kronstadt port, completed in 1901, cost the treasury more than 175 thousand rubles, not counting the cost of rescue work.

The Apraksin accident showed the weakness of the maritime department’s life-saving equipment, which was forced to resort to improvisation and the involvement of other public and private organizations. Assessing their contribution to the rescue of the ship, Z.P. Rozhestvensky pointed out that without the Ermak, the battleship would have been in disastrous condition; without the help of the Revel Rescue Society, it would have sank in November 1899. In difficult winter conditions, much was decided by the dedication to work and enterprise characteristic of Russians in extreme situations.

The commission to investigate the circumstances of the accident did not find any crime in the actions of the commander and navigational officer of the battleship. Former navigator of "Apraksin" P.P. Durnovo brilliantly rehabilitated himself in the Battle of Tsushima, guiding the crippled destroyer Bravy to Vladivostok. The experience of the winter of 1899/1900 prompted Captain 1st Rank V.V. Lindeström to speak in the “Sea Collection” with criticism of ensuring the unsinkability of his ship. In the article he wrote, “The Accident of the Battleship Admiral General Apraksin,” he pointed out the weakness of the bottom and bulkheads, the water permeability of the bulkhead doors, noted the complexity and inconvenience of installing drainage systems, the spread of water through the ventilation system and the sealing of pipes and cables in the bulkheads.

The article was reviewed by the shipbuilding department of the MTK, which, under the leadership of N.E. Kuteinikova very thoroughly justified the impossibility of its publication. In the review signed by I.M. Dikov, the prevailing idea was to protect the “honor of the uniform” of the committee itself and the naval department as a whole. Calling the Apraksin “a type that is structurally outdated to a certain extent,” the MTK shipbuilders considered that V.V. Lindeström outlined its shortcomings in a generalized form, and this could create “false ideas about modern shipbuilding” in society. It was stated that almost all the shortcomings over the past two years had been eliminated by the committee’s resolutions, and the specific issue of Apraksin would be discussed in the MTC based on the corresponding official report by S.O. Makarov, who also attached a duplicate of the article.

Based on the review from the Ministry of Transport and Communications, P.P. Tyrtov banned publication: the official press organ of the ministry could not give rise to attacks “on the order existing in the fleet.” Unfortunately, these orders became the object of attacks from the press very late, when the fleet had already paid for them in the Tsushima Strait.

Admiral General Apraksin spent the campaigns of 1902-1904 in the Training Artillery Detachment. During this period, its crew consisted of up to 185 personnel crew members and up to 200 gunner students, that is, a variable composition of trainees. In 1902, the battleship participated in the well-known demonstration maneuvers of the detachment in the presence of two emperors on the Revel roadstead, and at the beginning of the winter of the same year, it unsuccessfully tried to cross the ice of the Gulf of Finland and received damage to the hull. In general, according to the last commander of the battleship, Captain 1st Rank N.G. Lishina. appointed on April 6, 1903, the hull of the Apraksin, due to the accident in 1899 and the ice navigation in 1902, was severely “loose” and even leaked in the bow and along the entire upper deck.

In November 1904, Admiral General Apraksin, together with Admiral Ushakov and Admiral Senyavin, was assigned to a separate detachment of ships of the future 3rd Pacific Squadron for immediate passage to Far East- to strengthen the 2nd squadron.

The battleship began the campaign on December 22, 1904. During preparation for the campaign, a wireless telegraphy station of the Slyabi-Arco system, two Barr and Struda rangefinders (on the fore-mars and on the stern bridge), Perepelkin optical sights for 254-mm and 120-mm guns, two of the latter were replaced with new ones due to the large “execution”. For the 254-mm guns, 60 armor-piercing, 149 high-explosive and 22 segment shells were sent to the ship, but only 200 of them could be placed in the magazines, and the rest had to be loaded onto transports. The latter also carried an additional 100 high-explosive 254-mm shells for all three battleships of the same type. The ammunition capacity of 120 mm guns was 840 rounds (200 with armor-piercing, 480 with high-explosive and 160 with segment shells), 47 mm guns - 8180 rounds, 37 mm guns - 1620 rounds, and for 64 mm landing guns they took 720 shrapnel and 720 grenades. Additional ammunition with 180 armor-piercing and 564 high-explosive shells of 120 mm caliber and 8830 rounds of ammunition for 47 mm guns were also loaded onto the transports. At the request of commander N.G. Lishin on replacing the upper deck, commander of the Libau port of Emperor Alexander III, Rear Admiral A.I. Iretskoy responded with the phrase “You should defend everything,” followed by obscene expressions.

On February 2, 1905, “Admiral General Apraksin”, as part of a separate detachment of Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov, left Libau for the Far East. In the daytime battle of May 14, 1905 - the first phase of the Battle of Tsushima - "Admiral General Apraksin" valiantly fought the Japanese. Its crew consisted of 16 officers and mechanical engineers, 1 doctor, 1 priest, 8 conductors and 378 lower ranks (1 sailor died during the crossing in the Red Sea). In the battle formation of the 3rd armored detachment, "Apraksin" was the second matelot - in the wake of Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov's flagship battleship "Emperor Nicholas I".

At the beginning of the battle, the senior artillery officer of the battleship, Lieutenant Baron G.N. Taube concentrated fire on the Japanese flagship battleship Mikasa, but after 30 minutes he transferred it to a closer one armored cruiser"Nissin." The bow turret of the Apraksin was commanded by Lieutenant P.O. Shishko, aft - Lieutenant S.L. Trukhachev.

40 minutes after the start of the battle, the Admiral General Apraksin, which remained unharmed, passed within four cable lengths of the dying battleship Oslyabya. The death of "Oslyabi" and the failure of the flagship of the squadron "Prince Suvorov", on which fires were raging, made a grave impression on the "Apraksin" team, which entered the battle in a "cheerful mood". The senior ship mechanic, staff captain P.N. Mileshkin, soon after the sinking of the Oslyabi by the Japanese, could not stand it and “took alcohol,” for which he was removed by commander N.G. Lishin. Until midnight from May 14 to 15, when the commander restored the senior ship engineer's rights, his duties were performed by Lieutenant N.N. Rozanov.

However, the Apraksin crew bravely fought the Japanese until the evening. The battleship fired up to 132 254-mm shells (together with up to 153 shells fired at destroyers on the night of May 14-15) and up to 460 120-mm shells. The role of the Apraksin and other battleships of the 3rd detachment was clearly evident around 17:00, when they damaged the Japanese armored cruisers and forced the latter to retreat, stopping the shelling of the crowded transports, cruisers and destroyers of the Russian squadron. At the same time, “Apraksin” itself received damage. A 203-mm shell from the cruisers of Vice Admiral H. Kamimura's squadron hit the aft turret at the embrasure of a 254-mm gun; the shell's explosion lifted the roof and made it difficult for the turret to rotate, although it did not penetrate the armor. The shell fragments completely killed gunner Sonsky, wounded several gunners, and the tower commander, Lieutenant S.L. Trukhachev was shell-shocked, but remained at his post. A 120-mm shell hit the wardroom and mortally wounded the miner Zhuk, who soon died. Another shell of unknown caliber demolished the gaff, and fragments of others disabled the wireless telegraph network (antenna).

Having relatively minor damage and casualties (two dead, ten wounded), Admiral General Apraksin, without turning on the combat lighting, energetically repelled mine attacks on the night of May 15 and kept up with the Emperor Nicholas I, the flagship of the detachment , traveling to Vladivostok at a speed of at least 12-13 knots.

However, on the morning of May 15, N.I. Nebogatov’s detachment was surrounded by superior enemy forces. "Well. We burst into flames... we’ll die,” said N.G. Lishin on the bridge of the Apraksin. The officers and crew of the battleship were, indeed, ready to fight to the last and die. Commander Petelkin, “seduced by a successful aim,” even fired a sighting shot from a 120-mm cannon, but no new battle took place - Admiral Nebogatoye, as is known, surrendered to the enemy. His example (on signal) was followed by the commander of “Apraksin” N.G. Lishin (it is known that, on the orders of Lieutenant Taube, the gunners threw the locks of small guns and sights overboard).

So the ship, which bore the name of an associate of Peter the Great and the first admiral general of the Russian fleet, fell into the hands of the enemy. The Japanese called it "Okinoshima" and even used it in the operation to capture Sakhalin Island. In 1906-1915, the Okinoshima was a training ship, in 1915-1926 it was a wreck, and in 1926 it was scrapped.

For the surrender of the battleship to the enemy N.G. Lishin, even before returning from captivity, was stripped of the rank of captain 1st rank, and then convicted. The court's sentence - the death penalty - was changed by Nicholas II to 10 years of imprisonment in the fortress. The court also sentenced senior officer Lieutenant N.M. to two months of imprisonment in the fortress. Fridovsky, who could not prevent the “criminal intentions” of his commander.

Sources and literature

1.V. L. Construction of an ice dock according to the design of Major General Zharshov for sealing holes // Marine collection. 1905. No. 3. Neof. dept. P.67-77.
2. Gribovsky V.Yu., Chernikov I.I. Battleship "Admiral Ushakov", St. Petersburg: Shipbuilding, 1996.
3. Molodtsov S.V. Coastal defense battleships of the Admiral Senyavin type // Shipbuilding. 1985. No. 12. P.36-39.
4. Report on artillery training in MTK for 1893. St. Petersburg, 1900.
5.Russian-Japanese War 1904-1905 Fleet actions. Documentation. Dept. IV. Book 3. Issue. 1. St. Petersburg, 1912.
6. Tokarevsky A. Crippled battleships according to official assessment // Russian Shipping. 1898. March-April (No. 192-183). P.63-97.
7.RGAVMF.F.417, 421,921.

By the time the Fury was laid down, the completion of four coastal defense battleships was in full swing. Since they stood out as the most unsuccessful of all the ironclads that ever flew the white British naval ensign, the reasons for their construction are best explained by a quotation from Spencer Robinson:

"During the panic of 1870, when our country was in danger of being drawn into war, and our ports were in danger of being attacked by the enemy, the Council had to deal with the question of local coastal defense against any type of ships (more or less heavily armed) that could to carry out attempts to destroy large commercial and industrial centers on our coast. No heavily armored deep-draft warships could come close to even the most defenseless of these harbors. A serious attack was feasible [only] by light ships - most likely a general group of armored and non-armored ships... and it is easy to see that superiority in all respects remains with the class of ships adopted by the Admiralty as part of the coastal defense system." To implement this frivolous defensive policy, the Council decided to ensure coastal security through four “harbour defense” monitors, and based on considerations of both economy and expediency, the Cerberus project was chosen as the most suitable for the emergency program, slightly modified.

All four were launched very quickly (the Cyclops slipped into the Thames 10 months after laying), but when the immediate need for them waned, construction slowed down, and only after several years they entered service, although they were nominally handed over to contractors and accepted joined the fleet in 1872


"Cyclops". General form and reservation distribution scheme


As warships, they were the subject of ridicule throughout the navy, and one of the Council members who had pioneered their creation later wrote in The Times: “The chief builder's department was given orders to build ships that could easily capsize on the high seas, that would not could swim in shallow water, could not move from port to port except after a careful study of the barometer, but could easily go to the bottom during a storm, as well as due to a number of other reasons, and which ultimately received minimal offensive power with maximum defensive power. The chief builder’s department solved the problem very correctly and with great intelligence, giving us “coastal defense” ships that cannot protect our shores... what then does a “coastal defense” ship even mean?” Although built to a design designed specifically for harbor defense ships, they were classified as "coastal defense ships" capable of arriving anywhere on the coast where and when their presence was required, and as such able to put to sea safely. Before their construction was completed, the Design Committee, examining the variety and differences of the ships of the period, unanimously declared that "without the use of a certain superstructure along the sides of these ships for a significant part of the length of the hull, they can safely pass from port to port only in fair weather," and For this purpose, he recommended expanding the parapet to the sides and covering it with a deck, as a measure both to improve stability and to create better conditions for the crew.

The chief builder's department had already proposed a similar expansion of the parapet as a precautionary measure, since the available data for calculating the stability of low-sided ships on the high seas had not yet received practical confirmation. However, for the reason that any structural changes were decided only by the Council, which was quite satisfied with the existing situation, they were completed in accordance with the original design, and the prescribed changes followed only in 1886-1889. The added superstructure, which housed the commander’s quarters, additional quarters for the crew, a reading room, an infirmary, etc., made the ships more stable, and their habitability much better.


Armament

While the Rupert had the lowest armament-to-displacement ratio of any coastal defense ship, the Cyclops class represented the opposite extreme, displacing only 48 tons for every ton of armament. The four 10" 18-ton guns were mounted on Scott rigs of mixed design on a side pin, were equipped with hydraulic drives instead of levers and were much more efficient in terms of aiming and maintenance than any of the earlier ones in the fleet. During the modernization, a mine countermeasures battery was installed on the hanging deck four 47mm guns and five grapeshots, as well as two searchlights.


Booking

The freeboard was completely protected by armor, the total weight of which as part of the load was as high as the proportion of weapons, and was approximately equal to that of the Glatton, where it constituted a third of the displacement. However, carrying two towers and a large parapet, the “Cyclops” also had a relatively larger area that had to be protected with armor, and the frontal plates of the towers reached their greatest thickness - 254 mm. But, since it was not expected that they could encounter anything more serious than light ships in shallow water, this level of armor was regarded as quite sufficient.

The waterline belt was 203 mm thick in the middle and thinned to 152 mm at the ends; the ram was not supported by side armor. The height of the parapet above the waterline was 2.97 m, it was armored with 229 mm plates on the sides and 203 mm on the rounded ends, where a gun turret was installed, protected by 229 mm armor (254 mm in the frontal part). Both the upper deck and the parapet deck had a thickness of 38 mm, the plating had a thickness of 25-32 mm.


Equipment

As a relic of the original Cerberus design, Cyclops and Hecate retained a small post-mast in the bow forward of the turret, slightly to the left of it, which was used as a support for the boat shot guys. "Gorgon" and "Hydra" had only a mainmast.


Seaworthiness

As one might expect, these ships did not take much part in the life of the fleet, and year after year they hovered in their anchorages in the waters of the shipyards. In April 1878 they were not distributed among the ports, but were attached to Sir Cooper Key's Special Service Squadron, which had been raised in the Portland roadstead, and remained there for four months during the period of tension associated with Russian-Turkish war. In 1887, all four ships were equipped for maneuvers and they made sea crossings, the Gorgon withstood a storm off Queenstown and, according to Admiral Ballard, turned out to be “not as bad as a torpedo gunboat, but it wandered a lot on course.” Although their habitability left much to be desired, the crews regarded them as quite reliable ships. After the expansion of the parapet, the situation improved significantly, but at sea they were subject to the same inconveniences as the Devastation, since they received the same “stern bags” (semicircular deck cabin superstructures) on the quarterdeck. The angle of greatest stability was 25°, the rollover angle was 39°15\


Modernization

All four ships were taken out of service for modernization between 1885 (Hecate) and 1889, during which they were fitted with additional superstructures around the parapet and the parapet and upper decks received additional reinforcements. A waterproof bulkhead and an additional platform were added to the bow, and a false keel appeared. Since rapid-fire guns appeared on the hanging deck, it had to be expanded somewhat.


Cyclops-class coastal defense battleships

Builder

Launched

Commissioned

Price


"Tams Iron Works"


"Gorgon"

"Palmer's"




Dimensions, m

68.6 x 13.72x4.94


Displacement, t

3480 (after modernization 3560), hull and armor 2730, equipment 750


Armament

4 10" 18-ton muzzle-loading rifled (side salvo weight 744 kg)


Armor, mm

belt 152-203, parapet 178-229, turrets 229-254, conning tower 203-229, deck 38, plating 25-32, lining 230-280 (teak) (total armor weight 1130 t)


Mechanisms

"Cyclop", "Hydra": 2 sets of compound ("John Elder"), 2 high-pressure cylinders (diameter 787 mm), 2 low-pressure cylinders (diameter 1448 mm), piston stroke 686 mm, "Cyclop": indicated power 1660 hp, 11 knots, "Hydra": indicated power 1472 hp, 11.2 knots,

"Hecate", "Gorgon": 2 sets of horizontal 4-cylinder simple expansion, direct action ("Ravenhill"), cylinder diameter 1143 mm, piston stroke 610 mm, "Gorgon": indicated power 1670 hp, 11 kts, " Hecate": indicated power 1755 hp, 10.9 kts,


Fuel reserve, t


Crew, people

156 (after modernization 191)


"Cyclops"

Towed to Devonport for completion in January 1872 and placed until ready in April 1877 with the 1st Division Reserves, then assigned to the Special Service Squadron (April-August 1878), after which it was withdrawn to reserve at Chatham. Modernization in 1887-1889 in Portsmouth: superstructures along the sides, network protection, rapid-fire guns. Participated in maneuvers in 1887, 1889, 1890 and 1892, then transferred to the Reserve Fleet. In 1901, it was excluded from the lists of the active fleet.


"Gorgon"

Towed in April 1872 and placed in reserve at Devonport. She served as a Cambridge tender from 1874 to 1877, after which she was commissioned for the Special Service Squadron for the period April-August 1878. From 1878 she again served as a Cambridge tender. Modernization in 1888-1889, participated in the maneuvers of 1887, 1889, 1890 and 1892. Thereafter with the Reserve Fleet at Devonport until delisted in 1901.


"Hecate"

She arrived at Devonport in April 1872 and was completed until 1877. Commissioned for the Special Service Squadron in April 1878 and withdrawn to reserve at Devonport in August 1878. Modernized in 1885-1886, saw action in 1887, 1889, 1890 and 1892, then with the Reserve Fleet at Devonport until delisted in 1901.



"Hecate" in 1878


"Hydra"

She arrived at Devonport in August 1872 and was slowly completed until 1877. In April 1878 she was commissioned for the Special Service Squadron, in August 1878 she was withdrawn to reserve at Sheerness. She served as the Duncan's tender and was docked for the winter. Modernization in 1888-1889, participated in the maneuvers of 1887, 1889,1890 and 1892. Was in the Reserve Fleet at Chatham until delisted in 1901.



"Hydra" after entry into service




Battleship "Hydra"

All four ships were sold for scrap in 1903 for £8,400. for every.


The coastal defense battleship Pingyuan can be called the first full-fledged Chinese armored vessel. In the spring of 1886, a graduate of the Fuzhou Technical School, Wei Han (1851-1929), was sent to France to purchase ship steel and other materials.
The 35-year-old engineer used his stay in Europe to expand his technical knowledge. Returning home in the fall of the same year, he enlisted the support of the head of the Fuzhou Admiralty, Pei Yinsen (1823-1895), and on December 7, 1886, he laid the keel of the new ship on the slipway.

On January 29, 1888, the battleship was launched. The ceremony was honored by the presence of the head of the Fuzhou Arsenal, who performed traditional rites in honor of the goddess Mazu - the Lady of the Sea, the spirit of the Minjiang River and the patron spirit of the ship. After this, it was time to complete the construction of the battleship afloat, which continued until the spring of 1889. Thus, the construction of the Lunwei took a little more than two years. The cost of the ship was 524,000 silver liang.

On May 15, 1889, the battleship began sea trials, in which the Admiralty authorities again took part. By forcing the speed, the mechanics managed to accelerate the Lunwei to 12.5 knots, significantly exceeding the design speed. Perhaps this load was excessive. Shortly after noon, the battleship's hull was suddenly shaken by a strong vibration, and its walking speed dropped sharply.
When a diver examined the stern, it turned out that the ship had lost its right propeller. Having barely reached the factory, Lunwei went into repairs, which lasted three whole months.
It came out for repeated testing only on September 28, 1889 - this date should be considered the beginning of the battleship’s service. The first commander of the ship was Lin Yunmo. Together with the crew (in different time- from 145 to 204 people) he constantly had to deal with problems of varying severity.

By this time, the battleship had the following weapons: one 260-mm Krupp barbette gun of the 1880 model, two 150-mm Krupp guns on the side sponsons, four 47-mm rapid-fire Hotchkiss guns and two 10-barrel Gatling mitrailleuses. The barrel length of the 260 mm gun was 22 caliber. The weight of the barrel was 21.7 tons, and the machine accounted for another 15 tons.
The gun used three types of projectiles weighing about 162.1 kg - armor-piercing, high-explosive and shrapnel. The weight of the powder charge was 48 kg. The firing range reached 7400 m with a maximum elevation angle of 16.5°; at the muzzle, an armor-piercing projectile penetrated 391 mm of iron armor. According to some reports, the Pingyuan was armed with two 450-mm mine vehicles.

This statement seems doubtful, since the Chinese fleet of that time adopted German Schwarzkopf “tubes”, which had a smaller caliber. Thus, two 350-mm devices were probably installed at the ends of the battleship.

The ship had a characteristic and not very elegant appearance: sides with a noticeable slope inward, a low forecastle and a high bridge reminiscent of a bookcase. A single mast and a tall chimney completed the picture. On April 10, 1889, the battleship moved from Fuzhou to Shanghai. From there the ship was to proceed to Tianjin.

On May 8, 1890, a detachment of ships of the Beiyang Fleet, led by the battleship Dingyuan, entered Fuzhou. When they went to sea on the 28th of the same month, the Pingyuan was already taking its place in the column. Upon the fleet's arrival in Weihaiwei, Li He, a graduate of the Fuzhou Naval School, was appointed commander of the battleship.

The main event in the battleship's career was the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. The victories won by the Japanese in Korea forced the Chinese command to worry about the urgent transfer of reinforcements. For this purpose, it was decided to use chartered steamships heading to the port of Dadongou, at the mouth of the river. lu. The death of the transport "Koushing" ("Gaosheng"), shot by the Japanese cruiser "Naniwa" on July 25, 1894, forced Admiral Ding Zhuchang to use the main forces of the fleet to cover the transport.
On September 12, the fleet left Weihaiwei and arrived at the mouth of the Yalu four days later. The Pingyuan, the light cruiser Guangbing, two alphabet gunboats and a pair of destroyers entered the river to guard the landing site. The remaining ships of the squadron anchored 12 miles from the coast. At 10 a.m. on September 17, 1894, thick smoke appeared in the south. It soon became clear that the entire Japanese squadron was approaching the ship's mooring site. Twelve large ships of the Beiyang Fleet were opposed by eleven cruisers of the admiral

Ito Sukeyuki. The Japanese did not have battleships, so Ding Zhuchang had an advantage in tonnage, armor and the number of heavy guns. Perhaps that is why the Chinese admiral was in no hurry to call the Pingyuan from the river.

At 12.30, the Japanese flagship Matsushima raised the topmast flag, signaling the start of the battle. Superior to the Chinese in rapid-fire artillery, the Japanese divided into two detachments and actively maneuvered, showering the enemy with a rain of shells. The advantage in speed was also on the side of the Mikado sailors.

Closer to 14.00 Chinese ships at the mouth of the Yalu they finally saw a signal ordering them to join the squadron. Operating in tandem, the Pingyuan and Guangbing went to sea and found themselves on the right wing of the Chinese battle formation.
At 14.30, the battleship began a battle with the cruiser Matsushima at a distance of 2300 m. The Japanese flagship, which was subjected to the most intense shelling in the battle, had already had several hits. Gradually drawing closer, the ships fought an artillery duel, during which the Pingyuan gunners managed to achieve success. A 260-mm shell hit the middle part of the left side of the Matsushima and ended up in the wardroom, which was turned into a dressing station. Flying through it, it pierced the one-inch bulkhead and hit the mine compartment on the port side. Having torn off a loaded (!) mine apparatus from the machine and killed 4 sailors, the shell pierced another bulkhead and disabled the locking mechanism of the cruiser's 320-mm gun, facing the stern. At the same time, the shell broke apart, but no explosion occurred.

Only a miracle saved the Japanese from detonating their own ammunition. In total, during the battle, the cruiser Matsushima received 13 hits from heavy shells and lost about 100 crew members. A shell from the Pingyuan caused the most serious damage to it, forcing Admiral Ito to transfer his flag to the sister cruiser Hasidate. Meanwhile, the Pingyuan hit the cruiser Itsukushima at about 15.30. After that, he himself came under concentrated Japanese fire and caught fire. Its 260 mm gun was disabled and at about 16.30 the battleship left the battle, fighting numerous fires and slowly leaving in the direction Port Arthur. Another hour later the cannonade subsided and the battle ended.

After initial repairs, the Pingyuan moved from Port Arthur to Weihaiwei, where it remained until the end of the war. On February 12, 1895, after the surrender of the remnants of the Beiyang Fleet, the battleship passed into the hands of the victors. Thanks to the identity of the hieroglyphs, the Japanese easily accepted the Chinese name of the ship, which in their mouths began to sound like “Heien”.
In addition, the battleship retained decorations in the form of massive carved dragons attached to the middle part of the hull, in the area of ​​the chimney. They favorably distinguished the trophy and flattered the pride of the winners. On March 21, 1898, the ship was assigned to gunboats 1st class and received new weapons.

Instead of the old Krupp 150-mm guns, the Heien received 6-inch Armstrong quick-firing guns with a barrel length of 40 calibers, and in place of the 47-mm bow pair, two 120-mm guns were installed (according to some information, by the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War the latter were removed). The aft superstructure housed two 47-mm cannons with shields.

Under the command of Captain 2nd Rank K. Asabane, as part of the 7th Detachment of the Imperial Navy, he took part in Russian-Japanese war 1904-1905 She was destined to become latest event in the fate of the ship. On September 18, 1904, the Heien was located off Iron Island (Chinese name - Tedao), at the entrance to Pigeon Bay, west of Port Arthur.
The Japanese sailors did not know that two days earlier the Russian destroyer Skory (commander - Lieutenant P.M. Plen) secretly placed a barrage of 16 mines in the area. At 7:45 a.m. evening, a powerful explosion thundered on the starboard side of the Heyen.
There are two versions regarding its consequences. According to the first, the ship died in a matter of minutes, taking 198 people to the bottom.
According to other sources, the Heyen sank in shallow water and could have been saved if not for the storm that broke out the next morning.