To begin with, a little educational information about what a penal battalion is and the history of this phenomenon. Penal units are special military formations in the army, where during war or hostilities, guilty military personnel who have committed a variety of crimes are sent as a kind of punishment. For the first time in Russia, penal formations appeared in September 1917, however, due to the complete collapse of the state and the collapse of the army, these units did not take part in the battles and were subsequently disbanded. Penal battalions in the Red Army appeared on the basis of Stalin's order No. 227 of July 28, 1942. Formally, these formations in the USSR existed from September 1942 to May 1945.

Myth 1. “Penal units in the Red Army were numerous, half of the Red Army soldiers fought in penal battalions.”

Let us turn to the dry statistics of the number of fines in the USSR. According to archival statistical documents, the number (rounded) of penal prisoners in the Red Army: 1942. - 25 t. 1943 - 178 t. 1944 - 143 t. 1945 - 81 tons. Total - 428 tons. Thus, a total of 428 thousand people were in penal units during the Great Patriotic War. Considering that during the Great Patriotic War, the ranks of the armed forces Soviet Union 34 million people passed, it turns out that the share of soldiers and officers who were penalized was no more than 1.25%. Based on the above statistical data, it becomes clear that the number of penal battalions is greatly exaggerated and the influence of penal units on the general situation is at least not decisive.

Myth 2. “Penal units were formed only from prisoners and criminals of the USSR.”

This myth breaks the actual text of Order No. 227 itself. “...Form within the front from one to three (depending on the situation) penal battalions (800 people each), where to send middle and senior commanders and relevant political workers of all branches of the military who are guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, and put them on more difficult sections of the front to give them the opportunity to atone for their crimes against the Motherland with blood.” For ordinary soldiers and junior commanders guilty of similar violations, from 5 to 10 penal companies (from 150 to 200 people in each) were created within the army. Thus, it is worth distinguishing between a penal company and a battalion; these are fundamentally different combat units.

Penal battalions were formed from officers who had committed offenses before the socialist fatherland, and not from criminals who were specially collected into a separate battalion so that “the Germans would kill them.” Of course, not only military personnel could end up in penal units; persons convicted by the authorities of the Soviet Union were also sent, but courts and military tribunals were prohibited from sending persons convicted as punishment to penal units who were involved in counter-revolutionary activities, as well as persons those convicted of robbery, robbery, repeated theft and all persons who had previous convictions for the above crimes, as well as those who deserted from the Red Army more than once. In other cases, in order to send a person to serve in a penal unit, the identity of the convicted person, the details of the crime and other details of the case were taken into account. Not everyone and not everyone had the chance to atone for their crime with blood before their homeland.

Myth 3. “The penal battalions were ineffective.”

However, on the contrary, penal battalions were distinguished by serious combat effectiveness and placed these units in the most dangerous and difficult sectors of the front. The penal battalions did not need to be forcibly raised into battle; the desire to return the officer's shoulder straps and rehabilitate themselves before the Motherland was extremely great.

According to the memoirs of Alexander Pyltsin (Russian and Soviet writer, participant of the Great Patriotic War, historian. He was awarded twice the Order of the Red Star, the Order of the Patriotic War, II degree, the Order of the Red Banner and the Medal “For Courage”): “Our units were urgently transferred to the most dangerous direction, strengthening the regiment’s battle formations. Mixed with his soldiers, we noticed that there was some kind of revival in their ranks. After all, they understood that next to them, in the role of ordinary fighters, were recent officers in a variety of ranks and they would go on the attack together. And it was as if some fresh, irresistible force had poured into them.”

During the attack on Berlin, the penalty soldiers were ordered to be the first to cross the Oder and create a bridgehead for rifle division. Before the battle, they reasoned like this: “At least some of the more than a hundred penal prisoners of the company will swim, and if they swim, then they have not yet had impossible tasks. And even if they capture a small bridgehead, they will hold it until the last. Penalties will have no way back,” Pyltsin recalled.

Myth 4. “The soldiers of the penal units were not spared and were sent to slaughter.”

Usually this myth goes along with the text from Stalin’s order No. 227 “...to put them in more difficult sectors of the front to give them the opportunity to atone for their crimes against the Motherland with blood.” However, for some reason they forget to cite special points from the “Regulations on Penal Battalions active army", which states: "Clause 15. For combat distinction, a penitentiary may be released early upon the recommendation of the command of the penal battalion, approved by the military council of the front. For particularly outstanding combat distinction, the penalty soldier is also presented with a government award.” Based on this, it becomes clear that the main thing for exemption from punishment by a penal battalion is not death and “shedding of blood,” but military merit.

Of course, the penal units lost more soldiers than the usual garrisons of the Red Army, but we should not forget that they were sent to “the most difficult sectors of the front,” while the penal units showed their combat effectiveness. For example, according to the results of the Rogachev-Zhlobin operation in February 1944, when the Eighth Penal Battalion operated behind enemy lines in full force, out of just over 800 penal soldiers, about 600 were transferred to regular units of the Red Army, without “shedding blood”, namely for military merits to the Motherland. A rare combat mission carried out by penalty soldiers remained without the attention of the command and rewarding the soldiers. The command was interested in serving the punishment of the Red Army soldiers in penal units and in carrying out orders, and not in their senseless death at the front. At one time, K.K. Rokossovsky well described the words “atone with blood” as nothing more than an emotional expression designed to sharpen the sense of duty and responsibility in the war for one’s guilt.

Myth 5. “Penalty officers went into battle without weapons.”

In fact, the penal battalions had weapons no worse than in ordinary units of the Red Army, and in some places even better, this was due to the fact that these units were sent, as a rule, only to “the most difficult sectors of the front.” From the memoirs of the above-mentioned A.V. Pyltsyna: “I would like to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that our battalion was constantly replenished with new weapons in sufficient quantities. We already had the new PPSh assault rifles, which were not yet widely used among the troops, instead of the PPD. We also received new PTRS (i.e. Simonovsky) anti-tank rifles with a five-round magazine. In general, we never experienced a shortage of weapons.

I am talking about this because it was often stated in post-war publications that penalty prisoners were driven into battle without weapons or were given one rifle for 5-6 people, and everyone who wanted to arm themselves wished for the speedy death of the one who got the weapon. In army penal companies, when their number sometimes exceeded a thousand people, as officer Vladimir Grigorievich Mikhailov (unfortunately, now deceased), who then commanded such a company, told me many years after the war, there were cases when they simply did not have time to transport the required number weapons and then, if there was no time left for additional armament before completing an urgent combat mission, some were given rifles, and others were given bayonets from them. I testify: this in no way applied to officer penal battalions. There were always enough weapons, including the most modern ones.”

Thus, when approaching the issue of penal units, in no case can we talk about the uselessness of such units, much less deny the heroism of the soldiers who fought for the freedom and independence of the socialist Fatherland just like other parts of the Red Army. At the same time, in no case can one say that everything was based on penal units, that there were penal units all around and that they were used as “cannon fodder.” This is real blasphemy towards people who went through the penal divisions of the USSR.

TsAMO RF. Card index of the Military Medical Museum for hospital records.
Pyltsyn A.V. “Penal battalion in battle. From Stalingrad to Berlin without detachments.”
Pyltsyn A.V. “Pages of the history of the 8th penal battalion of the First Belorussian Front.”

Because of films such as “Penal Battalions” by Lev DANILOV and “Penal Battalion” by Nikolai DOSTAL, where Russian film stars played, one may get the impression that the Great Patriotic War was won by criminals from penal battalions, thinly diluted with repressed officers who were shot in the back by executioners from barrier detachments. It's time to debunk such tales.

- I'll get it, who stated that Hitler better Stalin, “because Hitler destroyed other peoples, and Stalin destroyed his own,” and any Gozman-Svanidzes don’t care about the truth, says the 92-year-old Alexander Pyltsyn, former commander company of the 8th Separate Penal Battalion, who voluntarily served in it for two years until the Victory. - We believed that officer penal battalions were actually elite troops. The most persistent, the most reliable. Therefore, there were never any barrier detachments behind them. And there were no criminals in them. Only military officers were appointed company commanders, and not thieves in law, as the screenwriter invented Volodarsky.

Leningrad historian Igor Pykhalov carried out colossal archival work, confirmed Pyltsyn’s words and, with numbers, refuted the myths about penal prisoners and barrier detachments.

MYTH 1.

Soldiers who were captured and escaped encirclement had virtually no chance of passing the NKVD check and bypassing the Gulag or penal battalions.

According to the summary data of the special camps, from October 1941 to March 1, 1944, 44,784 officers and 256,208 privates and sergeants who were captured, and 11,602 military personnel who emerged from encirclement were tested. Total 312,594 people.

On average, over 91 percent of soldiers from privates and sergeants successfully passed the test. The officers were treated much harsher. Over three percent were arrested, about 30 percent, and from the summer of 1943 to the fall of 1944, an average of 36.09 percent were sent to penal battalions every month. But more than 60 percent passed the test. Of these, almost two-thirds returned to the army, the rest were sent to convoy troops, the defense industry or hospitals.

MYTH 2.

Thousands of non-officer penal battalions were created, in which millions of penal prisoners laid down their lives.

These “undeniable” millions are calculated like this. After the release of the series “Penal Battalion,” Eduard Volodarsky repeatedly stated that during the war we had “thousands of penal battalions.” But on October 27, 2010, in the “Life Line” program, he named their “refined” number - 980. If you multiply it by 800, this is the maximum battalion strength established by order No. 227 (“Not a step back!”) dated July 28, 1942. , it turns out that 784,000 people could serve in them. Although in reality there could be much fewer fighters. Where then do the millions come from?

And here's where it comes from. The maximum service life for “change fighters,” as the penalty soldiers were officially called, was three months. That is, at least four times a year their composition was completely renewed. And they fought for four years! I don't want to multiply. And write them down en masse as killed. Who will check?

To these were added supposedly unaccounted for battalions that appeared at least once in someone’s memories. Thus, the 2nd Guards Army, according to the memoirs of a Ukrainian veteran, acquired another five unaccounted for penal battalions. But this information did not receive any confirmation.

On average, throughout the war, at most 25 penal formations fought per year, and not 65 at all, because due to the rapid movement of fronts, they simply did not have time to create and staff them or were suddenly disbanded.

The share of fines reached a maximum of 0.42 percent of the active army.

The table shows the number of fines sent annually according to archival reporting and statistical documents, without taking into account the composition of the assault brigades of 1941, where those who had committed fines were also sent. In total, 34 million 476 thousand 700 people passed through the Soviet Armed Forces during the war. But the contribution of 428 thousand fines to the Victory cannot be underestimated. They carried out the most difficult combat missions, and their mortality rate was 3-6 times higher than the level of losses of conventional troops.

MYTH 3.

Stalin came up with barrier detachments that recruited prison rabble, who would shoot their own during the retreat for the promised freedom.

Detachments were still in the army Peter I in case of desertion during Battle of Poltava. IN Civil War they were created by both whites and reds. They also had Napoleon, and Hitler to prevent mass exodus from the battlefield.

They appeared in the USSR in July 1941. And to this day, none of the historians have been able to find a single piece of evidence in the archives that the barrier detachments fired to kill their own people. The documents may not be open yet.

“I saw a barrage detachment under very dramatic circumstances. In the area of ​​​​the Five Kurgan heights, the Germans pressed us so hard that we fled, throwing away our overcoats, wearing only tunics. And suddenly our tanks, and behind them the skiers - a barrage detachment. Well, I think this is death! A young Estonian captain rolls up to me. Take, he says, the overcoat from the dead man, you’ll catch a cold...”

From the memoirs of a Hero of the Soviet Union Petra Laschenko, who commanded the division in the Battle of Kursk:

“The barrier detachments were located at a distance from the front line, covered the troops from the rear from saboteurs and enemy landings, detained deserters, who, unfortunately, were there; They controlled order at the crossings and sent soldiers who had strayed from their special forces to assembly points. But I don’t know that any of them fired at their own people. I asked for documents in this regard, but none were found.”

Now those who know about the war from pictures are making up fables, says a holder of the Order of Alexander Nevsky Anatoly Efremov. - Yes, such detachments were deployed in threatening areas. These people are not some kind of monsters, but ordinary fighters and commanders. They played two roles. First of all, they prepared a defensive line so that the retreating forces could gain a foothold on it. Secondly, they stopped alarmism. When the turning point in the war came, I no longer saw these detachments.

The high command often scolded the barrier detachments for the fact that when our units retreated, they themselves entered into battle, suffering heavy losses. During the defense of Stalingrad, the barrier detachment of the 62nd Army fought for two days with superior enemy forces for the railway station abandoned by our soldiers.

On September 19, 1942, the command of the 240th Infantry Division of the Voronezh Front ordered one of the companies of the 38th Army's barrier detachment to help units clear the grove from a group of German machine gunners. The company lost 31 soldiers. There are many similar examples.

Due to specific tasks, the best of the best were recruited into the barrier detachments: educated skiers, wrestlers, swimmers, rowers, and climbers. And also hunters, foresters, police officers, firefighters. Mostly these were Siberians and Far Easterners. Apparently, this explains the myth “about the prison rabble.”

Why did you end up in the penal battalion?

According to Alexander Pyltsyn, since the fall of 1944, about 65 percent of the penal prisoners were officers who had been captured, surrounded, or detained by barrage detachments. But there were other cases.

One commander, after a battle in which his unit suffered heavy losses, used the rations and vodka that went to the soldiers killed in this battle to remember them in a moment of calm. He was accused of wasting food property and given a month in a penal battalion.

Penalties were characterized by completely different behavior. For example, during a combat operation, the battalion captured an enemy truck carrying schnapps to the Germans. Winter, cold, and here is such a trophy! But the penalty officers simply shot the entire cargo in order to rid the following combat units of temptation.

A naval officer, the head of the ship's radio repair workshops, caught a speech on the radio Goebbels. And, egged on by his colleagues, he translated his speech into Russian. Got a month for promoting German propaganda.

The wounded lieutenant was taken to a hospital located not too far from his home. I wrote to my wife and said to come. The wife was in no hurry, the husband suspected something was wrong. And he ran home with a weapon. I caught my wife in bed with her lover. Well, he settled with them front-line - he shot them both. I ended up in a penal battalion for three months.

Pilot by last name Funny didn’t laugh when one of his subordinates suddenly began performing tricks in the air. As a result, he crashed the car and died. For the lack of real discipline in the group, Smeshny was sent to a penal battalion for two months.

Can't forgive

In Alexander Pyltsyn’s books there is a lot of pain and pride for the penalty box. But he cannot forgive the commanders for one incident. Just before the Victory, most of the fighters of his penal company near Berlin were blown up in a minefield. Although the sappers said that there were no mines on it at all.

So until the end of the war I was tormented by doubts: was it my fault? And now, six months later, the battalion commander (by that time already a colonel) Baturin at a battalion celebration near Berlin on May 9, 1945, he revealed a secret to me. He told me in confidence that then, by order of the general Batova our company was deliberately sent into a minefield. Batov's troops suffered heavy losses there. So, probably, the general decided, at the expense of the penalty box, to clear the field of mines for the advance of his troops.

Balthus hurried. By calling Kolychev a comrade captain, he thereby made it clear that the issue of his rehabilitation can be considered resolved. This is a matter of time: some one and a half to two weeks required to complete the established procedure of formalities in the Military Council of the front, where the battalion command sent representations to those penal soldiers who especially distinguished themselves in battles, who, without being wounded or shedding blood, nevertheless fell under under the definition of those who have atoned for their guilt and deserve to be released from the battalion.

The procedure for considering and approving submissions was of a generally accepted protocol nature with a predictable result. When making a decision, members of the Military Council, as a rule, did not delve into the details of the personal affairs and combat characteristics of the applicants, each individually, but “voted” the list as a whole. This was the case before and after Stalingrad. Everyone who was nominated by the battalion command to have their criminal record expunged and restored to their previous rights received the desired freedom. Therefore, Balthus had no reason to doubt or worry about the expected final result.

But this time the unexpected happened. The trouble-free office mechanism malfunctioned. To some members of the Military Council, the list of 81 people - two full-blooded platoons - seemed unreasonably high. “To justify entire platoons of fines is too much!” The question was returned for revision. After which only 27 names remained on the list. Exactly a third of the originally announced composition.

The last point of the decision was made to the battalion commander, Major Baltus, who was suspected of excessive loyalty and conciliatory sentiments that ran counter to current Regulations about penal units, members of the Military Council pointed out the inadmissibility of such actions in the future. This sounded like an accusation of underestimating and misunderstanding the fullness and complexity of the responsibility assigned to him, calling into question the compliance of his commander’s moral and volitional qualities with the norms of strict party demands and adherence to principles. The military council saw instability in the battalion commander's ability to successfully solve the task assigned to him.

It cannot be said that Balthus remained deaf to the danger of the warning, but something else bothered him more. The fact that the list of twenty-seven lucky ones did not include the name of Kolychev, whom he managed to so carelessly and recklessly encourage.

Despite the stinginess of external manifestations and the apparent isolation developed in him by his character and conditions of service, Balthus was extremely scrupulous and sensitive about everything that affected his name, could, even in passing, inadvertently, damage his reputation, expose empty deeds and promises to his subordinates. . Knowing thoroughly the “kitchen” of staff office work, he assumed that “refinement of the issue” was reduced to the simplest possible, purely mechanical operation - truncation. The list most likely was lowered to the lower clerk's desk and accepted for execution by an ordinary staff member, who carried out this operation, making ink cuts with a pen, like a scalpel, according to the given formula “two to one.” Two strikes - a pass, two strikes - a pass.

Baltus was not even notified, although they should have either returned the proposals to battalion headquarters for clarification, or involved the battalion commander in the finalization with a decisive vote. But they did neither one nor the other, which further inflamed Balthus’s protest indignation: the fate of the people was decided not by him, the battalion commander, the official authorized person who was given this right by position, but by an insignificant, nameless clerical cog, who, with a dispassionate executive stroke of the pen, divided penalty boxes on the right and left.

Balthus was burdened by the sudden guilt before Kolychev and now, waiting for his arrival, continued to be annoyed with himself and annoyed at the staff rats who had framed him, just as he became annoyed and annoyed every time it happened, against his own will, to find himself in an awkward position for which he considered himself less all responsible.

In the end, it is not so important which of the penalty prisoners - Petrov, Ivanov, Sidorov, people with names that mean nothing to him - received the long-awaited freedom, and who did not. All those represented deserved to be released. But Kolychev...

Baltus noticed Kolychev even then, on the way to the front, when he appointed him to the post of platoon commander. Getting acquainted with the personal files of penal officers, Balthus, this was his favorite pastime, checked them with the famous Catherine’s phrase “execution cannot be pardoned,” looked for and then kept in sight those whose true essence, in his opinion, corresponded to the semantic meaning of the phrase with a semicolon in second position...

Balthus's thoughts were interrupted by a soft knock on the door.

- Come in!

The figure of Kolychev appeared in the doorway. Having crossed the threshold, Pavel stood at attention and, raising his hand to his filthy, faded cap, clearly, in a statutory manner, reported:

“Citizen Major, platoon commander, penal officer Kolychev has arrived on your orders.

Baltus rose from the table towards him and, with a gesture of his hand, pointed to the man standing at the opposite side factory urban chair with a high curved back.

- Take a seat.

Pavel obediently walked to the table and sat down at the indicated place.

– Can you guess why I called you?

Pavel shrugged his shoulders vaguely, noting to himself that the conversation began with “you,” which in itself was already unusual.

Balthus, apparently, did not care about his answer.

– Let’s start by treating ourselves to some tea. Without ceremony or chain of command,” he suggested, narrowing his eyes at Pavel. – Do you want strong, real, Georgian?..

Saying this, Balthus moved to the front door, leaned out into the corridor, and called out to the orderly:

- Gataulin! A couple of glasses of tea!

All this time, Kolychev, struggling with the growing influx of internal nervous trembling in order to prevent it from breaking out, watched the battalion commander, became increasingly confused, unable to understand what was happening, what preceded the strange mysterious reception given to him by the formidable, not looking like a battalion commander. What lies behind the unusual behavior of him? Judging by Balthus’s benevolent attitude, it was necessary to prepare for something pleasant and exciting, which would certainly surprise and delight. But why?

From the moment two hours ago Kolychev received the order to report to the headquarters at 10.00 in person to the battalion commander, he was at a loss, trying to imagine what could have caused Balthus’ interest in his person. It is clear that the reason for the call cannot be an ordinary event - the penalty box was not called to the battalion commander for trifles. But, on the other hand, nothing extraordinary, out of the ordinary, in last days nothing happened either in the battalion or around it. Except that the news about the failed amnesty shook everyone up. But Paul was not the only one who failed. Of the three representatives of the second platoon, the path to freedom opened only for Kuskov. Friends gave Andrey a farewell. Baltus has nothing to do with this whole story; the proposals for the losers were rejected by the Military Council of the front.

Returning to the table, Baltus softly sank into a chair and turned his squinting, smiling gaze to Kolychev. He asked more affirmatively than questioningly:

- Well, fate is a villain, the life of a penal prisoner is a penny?

“It turns out that’s true,” Pavel did not deny.

– Frankly, I’m no less upset. Injustice is an evil that emasculates the soul with resentment and undermines faith, the source of our strength. I propose to consider the incident settled and forgotten. From now on, for me personally, you have reckoned with your shameful past, you have fully atoned for your guilt. – Baltus slowly lit a cigarette, moved the pack towards Kolychev, inviting him with his eyes to join. - Yes, and I don’t believe in your guilt at all. She was not and is not. He took over someone else’s, covered his lost friend... Right? Or will you deny it again?

(Narrated by Alexander Bernstein, a participant in the Great Patriotic War)

“Cowards, alarmists, deserters - exterminated on the spot.”

From Order No. 227 for 1942 (“not subject to publication”)

I called my essay “Penal Battalions.” There were mainly not criminals, but commanders who had been demoted for a month and, for various reasons, had not completed their tasks in battle. This was the negative side of the war, just like executions on the spot, or, as it was said in order No. 227, “extermination.” These were the costs of war, losses not from the enemy. Their. There are no statistics on those who visited and died in penal battalions. It has never been published. Our military historians should have carried out this analysis long ago...

The Great Patriotic War... Its first two years were especially difficult and dramatic, when our army, suffering huge losses, was forced to retreat. The situation then became tragic, and in order to change the course of the war, Stalin signed the order of the People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO) No. 227 of July 28, 1942.

This order went down in history and served as a tough lesson for the army, but it also became a mobilizing force, and this must be given its due. Today only veterans, direct participants in the battles, can remember this order, because the order concerned them. Moreover, not even all military personnel of that time knew the details of this order, because it was essentially secret, that is, it was not subject to reproduction and publication. In "History of the Second World War" and " Military encyclopedia", issued by Military Publishing House before 1987, when strict censorship was still in effect, order No. 227 is presented in a truncated form. Only the current situation on the fronts is described (where the army itself is blamed) and in a few words the task: what needs to be done. The above works do not even mention the harsh and unprecedented measures that were allowed and carried out in relation to the front-line soldiers themselves.

Here is how order No. 227 in the fifth volume of the “History of the Second World War,” signed by Stalin, is briefly stated: “... The enemy throws more and more forces to the front and, regardless of heavy losses, climbs forward, rushes into the interior of the country, captures more and more new areas, devastates and ruins our cities and villages, rapes, robs and kills our Soviet population. Fighting is taking place in the Voronezh region, on the Don, in the south, at the gates of the North Caucasus. The German occupiers are rushing towards Stalingrad, towards the Volga and want to capture Kuban at any cost, North Caucasus with its oil and grain wealth. The enemy has already captured Voroshilovgrad, Rossosh, Kupyansk, Valuyki, Novocherkassk, Rostov-on-Don, half of Voronezh…..After the loss of the Baltic states, Donbass and other regions, we have much less territory, people, grain, plants, factories. We lost more than 70 million people, more than 800 million pounds of grain per year and more than 10 million tons of metal per year. We no longer have superiority over the Germans either in human reserves or in grain reserves. To retreat further means to destroy oneself, and at the same time the Motherland...

It follows from this that it is time to end the retreat. No step back. This should now be our main call. We must stubbornly, to the last drop of blood, defend every position, every meter of Soviet territory, cling to every piece of Soviet land and defend it to the last opportunity. Will we be able to withstand the blow and then push the enemy back to the West? Yes, we can…..What is already missing? There is a lack of order and discipline in companies, battalions, regiments, and divisions. This is now our main drawback... We must establish the strictest order and iron discipline in our army if we want to save the situation and defend our Motherland. From now on, the iron law of discipline for every commander, Red Army soldier, and political worker should be the requirement: NOT A STEP BACK WITHOUT THE ORDER OF THE HIGH COMMAND. Alarmists and cowards must be exterminated on the spot.”

Following this order, literally the next day, July 29, 1942, the troops received a directive from the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army. The directive ordered all political workers, all communists to restructure party and political work, ensuring one task in battle: not a step back without an order from the high command. “Communists - forward” - must ensure this order with their unyielding example.” It must be said that order No. 227 (I remember well) with its iron edge was directed against the command and political composition Red Army (at that time the officer category had not yet been introduced). This is what the order said: “We cannot continue to tolerate commanders, commissars, political workers of units and formations who leave combat positions without permission. It cannot be tolerated any longer when commanders, commissars, and political workers allow a few alarmists to determine the situation on the battlefield, so that they drag others into retreat and open the front to the enemy..." "Alarmists and cowards must be exterminated on the spot." The order made an explanation: the enemy, in order to increase discipline and responsibility, formed more than 100 penal companies for privates and about a dozen penal battalions for officers who violated discipline and showed cowardice in battle. Such officers in Hitler's army were deprived of orders and merits, and were sent to difficult sectors of the front so that they could atone for their guilt. German command formed special barrage detachments, placed them behind unstable divisions and ordered to shoot those who tried to retreat or surrender. These measures, according to I.V. Stalin, increased the discipline and combat effectiveness of Hitler's army. “Shouldn’t we learn from our enemies in this matter, just as our ancestors learned in the past and then defeated them?” - asks the question in order No. 227 by the one who issued it - I.V. Stalin. And he answers firmly: “I think it should.” And further specifically: commanders of companies, battalions, regiments, divisions, relevant commissars and political workers who retreat from combat positions without orders from above are traitors to the Motherland. They should be treated as traitors to the Motherland. Order No. 227 defines: “Remove from office commanders, commissars, political workers of all levels who are guilty of cowardice, instability, violation of discipline, who allowed the withdrawal of troops, remove from office and send to a higher tribunal, so that after the trial, in difficult sectors of the front, they can atone for their guilt. " This part of the order applies more to large staff commanders who were not on the front line and could not be “exterminated on the spot.” And further the order prescribed: “To form within the front from one to three penal battalions (800 people each) for senior and middle demoted command personnel, so that in more difficult conditions they can atone for their guilt with blood.” “Form within each army from 5 to 10 penal companies (from 150 to 200 people in each), where to send privates and junior commanders in order to give them the opportunity to atone for their guilt before the Motherland with blood in more difficult conditions.” Let's think about it. If we count, according to Order No. 227, the number of officers demoted to penal battalions as much as possible along the front, then this amounts to 3-800, that is, 2,400 people. Already at that time, if we count the given number of penal prisoners in penal companies within the front, this should be a maximum of 6 thousand people. The figures themselves for the planned punishments of people are gigantic. But if we consider the average army ratio of officers and privates - about 20-30 privates per commander, then the ratio of the planned penalty cases for officers (commanders) is many times higher than the penalties for privates. Apparently, during that period I.V. Stalin placed all the blame on the commanders and was not against replacing them during the war, which in fact took place.

“Form within each army up to five barrier detachments of 2,000 fighters each. Place them in the rear of unstable divisions and oblige them in combat conditions in cases of flight, panic, retreat of alarmists and cowards to be shot on the spot and thereby help honest fighters fulfill their duty to the Motherland.”

It was a bitter time, incredibly difficult. The sad thing is that Comrade Stalin learned from the basest, inhumane Hitler-fascist system. It is also bitter that he completely shifted his guilt and the guilt of the General Staff (which was under his control and the control of the NKVD) in the operational-tactical unpreparedness of the army for battles on its territory to the army. And let’s take the very concept of “penal battalion” - both words are not Russian). A fine is a violation that is subject to punishment.

I, an ordinary author and an ordinary citizen, do not undertake to discuss the personality of I.V. here. Stalin. Although at an insanely high cost, with his energy he managed to improve the situation at the front and led the country to victory. In this regard, Order No. 227 played a positive role. But for a while. Only for a while. Order No. 227 was read or announced in companies, batteries, squadrons, regiments, etc.

I myself was then a captain, an engineer of the regiment, explaining the order in front of the formation of Red Army soldiers, sergeants, and commanders in relation to the tasks that the regiment was performing.

The balloon is not ready to rise and repel the attack of enemy aircraft - it means you retreated in battle. - The combat vehicle failed, you did not follow the order.

Unauthorized absence, sleeping on duty, loss of weapons or equipment, not to mention crossbows - this is a violation of order No. 227, and hence a tribunal and, possibly, a penal battalion or a penal company (to each his own). Thus, the commanders of aviation, naval, technical, anti-aircraft artillery and other units themselves interpreted this order, adapting their own internal, sometimes completely different, violations to fit it. The internal instructions of Order No. 227 were not made public in penal battalions and penal companies, but they undoubtedly existed, since the regulations of the Red Army applied only to personnel troops. However, some details are known. For example, all full-time commanders, from junior to the battalion commander himself, had a full-time category one step higher. That is, the battalion commander had the rights of a regiment commander, the platoon commander had the rights of a company commander, etc. The internal order is now known from the recollections of eyewitnesses (for example, the author).

Let's take as an example a penal battalion for demoted commanders. The formula for punishment of the tribunal or other body was: “Deprive military rank, demoted to the ranks, sent to a penal battalion for a period of one month, to atone for his guilt with blood.” Those who entered the penal battalion handed over all their awards, party and other documents and changed into official clothes without signs of belonging to the military (without an asterisk on the cap). He addressed his superiors in the form of “citizen lieutenant”, etc., and he himself had the rank of “penal officer”. During the 30 days they spent in the penal battalion, the penal battalions had to be in battle at least once. They were sent in groups, platoons, squads to the most risky areas, through minefields etc. Behind them was a unit of the NKVD, which was supposed to shoot the penal prisoners with machine guns if they began to retreat or crawl back. Even the wounded were not allowed to leave the battle: they would shoot, they were warned, we don’t know why you are crawling back, wait, they will pick you up later.

There were similar procedures in penal companies. The tribunal had the right to send those demoted to them, but in practice this was decided by the commanders of the formations. This punishment was imposed for cowardice, for retreating from battle, for losing a weapon, for a machine gun that failed in battle, for deliberate self-harm (in order to leave the front as a non-combatant), for failure to comply with a combat order, for unsecured field communications, desertion, unauthorized absences, etc. d. From that time on, the words “fine battalion” or “fine” became a scarecrow and an incentive, and later senior commanders thus reminded the junior ones of their place.

The penalty soldier who had completed the battle was released to his unit, with his awards and titles returned. In case of death, the family was informed, as usual, about the deceased, and the family received a pension. Penal battalions and companies fought brutally in battle. There is an enemy in front, machine guns behind. You need to go at the enemy and destroy him. Go ahead. In some literary works I read that penalty officers went on reconnaissance missions. I don't know this. Although intelligence and intelligence are different. If you are sent to scout enemy minefields, and behind you are NKVD or SMERSH machine guns, then this is quite possible. It’s hard for a penalty box to hope for luck, but anything can happen.

Already in mid-1943, the course of the war began to change in favor of the Red Army. The defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad, breaking the blockade of Leningrad and other successes raised the morale of our army. Panic and retreats in battle, cases of crossbows, and evasion of battle have become rare: for these reasons, the number of commanders and privates who needed to be tried has decreased. However, the penal units created in July 1942 remained until the very end of the war. They weren’t supposed to be without “work.” Then a slightly different contingent of fines appeared, sent to serve their sentences for other reasons and often without a trial.

So, when the troops were resting or re-forming, especially in the territory from which the Germans were expelled, cases of AWOL, drunkenness, relationships with local women and venereal diseases occurred among the Red Army soldiers. This caused concern among the command, as the disease could spread and affect the combat effectiveness of the soldiers. Therefore, it was announced that the latter would be considered as deliberate self-mutilation for leaving the front to the hospital and for this they would be transferred to a penal company. To the soldier’s credit, it must be said that these phenomena were quite rare. But they were.

Despite the military successes of the army, despite the ceased retreat and panic, demotions and sending to the penal battalion of command personnel continued, but the reasons were no longer the same as those stipulated in order No. 227. For example, a gun sank during the crossing, a pilot on a combat mission confused the trenches and was bombed on their own, the anti-aircraft gunners shot down their plane, the person in charge failed to deliver ammunition on time, the quartermaster did not lead the convoy through the line of fire, did not provide food, etc. However, another, already disgusting feature appeared - this is the settling of scores by ambitious commanders - seniors with juniors, denunciation in SMERSH has also been revived.

In the summer of 1943, an order from the army commander arrived at the regiment, ordering that for poor maintenance of small arms (rifles) and a shortage of 2 rifles, according to the records of the commander of the 4th detachment of our 11th regiment, barrage balloons, Captain V.I. Grushin was demoted to private and sent to a penal battalion for a period of 1 month to atone for his guilt with blood. Grushin was one of the most experienced and respected commanders in the regiment. Therefore, such a sudden decision by the army commander (namely the commander, not the tribunal) was incomprehensible to us. Moreover, Grushin had no reprimands or penalties before this. His squad was always combat-ready and raised a balloon barrage before an enemy air raid. But the real reason was clear to the regiment officers. The head of the barrage balloons from the air defense headquarters of Leningrad, Colonel Volkhonsky, settled the score with him. He was a rude, vindictive, arrogant, illiterate person. He was accidentally promoted from quartermaster when many experienced air defense commanders were sent to rifle units to replace losses. Volkhonsky could not come to terms with the fact that the detachment commander Grushin defended his opinion and did not allow insults to himself and the people of his detachment. As for rifles, the regiment had rifles that had already passed Soviet-Finnish war, partly captured, in a word, fairly worn out, with a rash in the bores that can no longer be removed. The officer who checked small arms in Grushin's detachment was from army headquarters and sent by Volkhonsky. And the decision to punish Grushin was presented to the army commander, Major General Zashikhin, by the same Volkhonsky. Vasily Ivanovich Grushin never returned from the penal battalion. We were all worried about this smart and honest commander. Such senseless losses in war are especially bitter.

I also had a chance to be demoted to a penal battalion. This was completely unexpected for me. In the spring of 1943, an order came to the secret part of the regiment, signed by the commander of the Leningrad Air Defense Army, Major General Zashikhin, a member of the military council, brigade commissar Verov (I don’t remember the third person). With this order, I was demoted to private in a penal battalion for a period of 1 month, “so that I could atone for my guilt with blood.” I was accused of the following:

1) poorly camouflaged two winches, broken from an enemy artillery attack; 2) while examining the broken cables of the balloons, I allegedly did not bring the guilty mechanics to justice;

3) during combat duty at night at the regiment’s command post, he could not accurately report whether the last balloon had landed, and upon repeated requests from the operational duty officer at the army headquarters’ command post, he swore at him.

This is what was written in the Troika’s order. The regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel Lukyanov, and the military commissar, battalion commissar Korshunov, and I were shocked by the absurdity of this decision. We understood that this was the work of the same Volkhonsky, who thus strengthened his position.

At the same time, the combat winches, damaged by enemy shelling, were located in the area of ​​​​Vasilievsky Island, that is, 10 km from me, and were at the disposal of the detachment commander. I did not put the motorists on trial because it was not their fault. The last balloon was hit by shrapnel during artillery shelling, it landed 2 hours later, and as for the swearing, all of us at the front were not angels and it was absurd to blame it. It was even more savage to simply demote a professional, a military engineer, which I had already become in 1943, and send me to a penal battalion...

Similar cases occurred in other regiments. And each time the order was signed by the “troika” led by the commander, Major General Zashikhin. By the way, the air defense regiments defending Leningrad were experienced and disciplined. Over the entire period of hostilities, aviation fighter regiments, anti-aircraft artillery regiments and barrage balloon regiments shot down 1,561 enemy aircraft over the sky of the city and on the approaches to it. It was best army Air defense at that time. However, I learned about the reasons for such cruelty of the commander towards army officers only 30 years after the war. I.I. told me about this in 1975. Geller, former head of the political department of our army.

Since 1940, Zashikhin, having received the rank of major general, was the head of the air defense of the Baltic Fleet. The sudden air strikes carried out by the Germans on the night of June 22, 1941 and the following days paralyzed and destroyed the air defense systems of the Baltic Fleet. The capitals of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia were captured. The remains of our ships arrived in Kronstadt and Leningrad. Zashikhin, of course, took our losses seriously. After all, the General Staff had just received a directive not to get involved in provocations. He expected trouble. He was summoned by A.A., a member of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front. Zhdanov, but not to bring him to justice, but to appoint him to command the 2nd Air Defense Corps (later the Leningrad Army of Air Defense Forces). Zhdanov said that Zashikhin would obviously be appointed commander of the air defense corps, but warned that not a single enemy aircraft should appear in the skies over the city. The Germans are already using our airfields in the Baltics. German reconnaissance planes gain altitude up to 7–8 km. This is not within the reach of our anti-aircraft aimed fire, so their raids cannot be ruled out, Zashikhin reported.

You will bear responsibility, we have not yet forgotten that you were previously expelled from the party as a Trotskyist,” said Zhdanov, and he was simultaneously a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, secretary of the Central Committee and secretary of the regional committee. It was a stab in the back. Zashikhin did not expect this. - Comrade Zhdanov, I was then a very young party member, an illiterate sailor. After all, I later asked for forgiveness from the party and was reinstated in 1929. “Yes, we know that,” said Zhdanov, “we know that the party has forgiven you.” But she will not forgive a second time if the air defense does not properly protect the city of Leningrad. Then you will have no mercy. Go fight, strengthen your discipline and combat capability, and remember our conversation... So Zashikhin found himself under the sword of Damocles. Subsequently, his professionalism, rigor and cruelty were appreciated by the high command and played a role in the nomination. He ended the war as a colonel general, commander of one of the air defense fronts.

According to the order, I was in a penal battalion, but was suddenly recalled from it to my old regiment, but to a rank and position one step lower. The order of the Military Council was revised. The regiment commander and commissar achieved my release. I always highly valued military camaraderie and decency, and six months later I was again restored to my rank of captain and engineer of the 11th Barrage Balloon Regiment.

After the defeat Nazi troops near Leningrad, from 1944 I fought on other fronts, already in the position of senior inspector of the aeronautics department of the central apparatus. On June 24, I took part in the Victory Parade on Red Square in 1945.